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ID:1020807
User:173.11.51.45
Article:Battle of Midway
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m (Attacks on the Japanese fleet)
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==Strategic context==
 
==Strategic context==
Japan had attained its initial strategic goals quickly, taking the [[Philippines]], [[British Malaya|Malaya]], Singapore, and the [[Dutch East Indies]] (now [[Indonesia]]); the latter, with its vital resources, was particularly important to Japan. Because of this, preliminary planning for a second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942. However, there were strategic disagreements between the [[Imperial Japanese Army|Imperial Army]] and Imperial Navy, and infighting between the Navy's [[Imperial General Headquarters|GHQ]] and [[Admiral]] [[Yamamoto Isoroku|Isoroku Yamamoto]]'s [[Combined Fleet]], such that a follow-up strategy was not formulated until April 1942.<ref>Prange, ''Miracle at Midway'', pp.13–15, 21–23; Willmott, ''The Barrier and the Javelin'', pp. 39–49; Parshall and Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', pp. 22–38.</ref> Admiral Yamamoto finally succeeded in winning the bureaucratic struggle by using a thinly veiled threat to resign, after which his operational concept of further operations in the Central Pacific was accepted ahead of other competing plans.<ref>Parshall and Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', p. 33; Prange, ''Miracle at Midway'', p. 23.</ref>
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Japan had attained its initial strategic goals quickly, they killed all of the black people taking the [[Philippines]], [[British Malaya|Malaya]], Singapore, and the [[Dutch East Indies]] (now [[Indonesia]]); the latter, with its vital resources, was particularly important to Japan. Because of this, preliminary planning for a second phase of operations commenced as early as January 1942. However, there were strategic disagreements between the [[Imperial Japanese Army|Imperial Army]] and Imperial Navy, and infighting between the Navy's [[Imperial General Headquarters|GHQ]] and [[Admiral]] [[Yamamoto Isoroku|Isoroku Yamamoto]]'s [[Combined Fleet]], such that a follow-up strategy was not formulated until April 1942.<ref>Prange, ''Miracle at Midway'', pp.13–15, 21–23; Willmott, ''The Barrier and the Javelin'', pp. 39–49; Parshall and Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', pp. 22–38.</ref> Admiral Yamamoto finally succeeded in winning the bureaucratic struggle by using a thinly veiled threat to resign, after which his operational concept of further operations in the Central Pacific was accepted ahead of other competing plans.<ref>Parshall and Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', p. 33; Prange, ''Miracle at Midway'', p. 23.</ref>
   
 
Yamamoto's primary strategic goal was the elimination of America's carrier forces, which he perceived as the principal threat to the overall Pacific campaign.{{#tag:ref|In fact, U.S. submarines were more dangerous to Japan's efforts. Blair, ''Silent Victory'' ''passim''; Parillo, ''Japanese Merchant Marine''.|group=nb}} This concern was acutely heightened by the [[Doolittle Raid]] (18 April 1942) in which [[United States Army Air Forces|USAAF]] [[B-25 Mitchell]]s launched from {{USS|Hornet|CV-8|6}} bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a severe [[psychological operations|psychological]] shock to the Japanese and showed the existence of a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands.<ref>Prange, ''Miracle at Midway'', pp. 22–26.</ref>{{#tag:ref|Apparently, because of poor IJN [[Anti-submarine warfare|ASW]] training and doctrine, the Japanese ignored the presence of American submarines off their coast, beginning with Joe Grenfell's {{USS|Gudgeon|SS-211|2}} which arrived some three weeks after Pearl Harbor. Blair, ''Silent Victory'', p.110; Parillo, ''Japanese Merchant Marine''; Peattie & Evans, ''Kaigun''.|group=nb}} This and other successful "hit and run" raids by American carriers, showed that they were still a threat although, seemingly, reluctant to be drawn into an all-out battle.<ref>Parshall & Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', pp. 31–32.</ref> Yamamoto reasoned that another attack on the main U.S base at [[Pearl Harbor]] would induce all of the American fleet out to fight, including the carriers; however, given the strength of American land-based air power on Hawaii, he judged that Pearl Harbor could no longer be attacked directly.<ref>Parshall & Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', p. 33.</ref> Instead, he selected Midway, at the extreme northwest end of the [[Hawaiian Islands|Hawaiian Island]] chain, some {{convert|1300|mi|nmi km|lk=on|abbr=on}} from [[Oahu]]. Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore strongly defend it.<ref>Willmott, ''Barrier and the Javelin'', pp. 66–67; Parshall and Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', pp. 33–34.</ref> The U.S. did consider Midway vital; after the battle, establishment of a U.S. [[submarine]] base on Midway allowed submarines operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and reprovision, extending their radius of operations by {{convert|1200|mi|km|abbr=on}}. An airstrip on Midway served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on [[Wake Island]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.fws.gov/midway/postwar.html|title=After the Battle of Midway |publisher=Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refuge}}</ref>
 
Yamamoto's primary strategic goal was the elimination of America's carrier forces, which he perceived as the principal threat to the overall Pacific campaign.{{#tag:ref|In fact, U.S. submarines were more dangerous to Japan's efforts. Blair, ''Silent Victory'' ''passim''; Parillo, ''Japanese Merchant Marine''.|group=nb}} This concern was acutely heightened by the [[Doolittle Raid]] (18 April 1942) in which [[United States Army Air Forces|USAAF]] [[B-25 Mitchell]]s launched from {{USS|Hornet|CV-8|6}} bombed targets in Tokyo and several other Japanese cities. The raid, while militarily insignificant, was a severe [[psychological operations|psychological]] shock to the Japanese and showed the existence of a gap in the defenses around the Japanese home islands.<ref>Prange, ''Miracle at Midway'', pp. 22–26.</ref>{{#tag:ref|Apparently, because of poor IJN [[Anti-submarine warfare|ASW]] training and doctrine, the Japanese ignored the presence of American submarines off their coast, beginning with Joe Grenfell's {{USS|Gudgeon|SS-211|2}} which arrived some three weeks after Pearl Harbor. Blair, ''Silent Victory'', p.110; Parillo, ''Japanese Merchant Marine''; Peattie & Evans, ''Kaigun''.|group=nb}} This and other successful "hit and run" raids by American carriers, showed that they were still a threat although, seemingly, reluctant to be drawn into an all-out battle.<ref>Parshall & Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', pp. 31–32.</ref> Yamamoto reasoned that another attack on the main U.S base at [[Pearl Harbor]] would induce all of the American fleet out to fight, including the carriers; however, given the strength of American land-based air power on Hawaii, he judged that Pearl Harbor could no longer be attacked directly.<ref>Parshall & Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', p. 33.</ref> Instead, he selected Midway, at the extreme northwest end of the [[Hawaiian Islands|Hawaiian Island]] chain, some {{convert|1300|mi|nmi km|lk=on|abbr=on}} from [[Oahu]]. Midway was not especially important in the larger scheme of Japan's intentions, but the Japanese felt the Americans would consider Midway a vital outpost of Pearl Harbor and would therefore strongly defend it.<ref>Willmott, ''Barrier and the Javelin'', pp. 66–67; Parshall and Tully, ''Shattered Sword'', pp. 33–34.</ref> The U.S. did consider Midway vital; after the battle, establishment of a U.S. [[submarine]] base on Midway allowed submarines operating from Pearl Harbor to refuel and reprovision, extending their radius of operations by {{convert|1200|mi|km|abbr=on}}. An airstrip on Midway served as a forward staging point for bomber attacks on [[Wake Island]].<ref>{{Cite web|url=http://www.fws.gov/midway/postwar.html|title=After the Battle of Midway |publisher=Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refuge}}</ref>
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