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In the BB84 protocol Alice sends quantum states to Bob using single photons. In practice many implementations use laser pulses attenuated to a very low level to send the quantum states. These laser pulses contain a very small number of photons, for example 0.2 photons per pulse, which are distributed according to a Poissonian distribution. This means most pulses actually contain no photons (no pulse is sent), some pulses contain 1 photon (which is desired) and a few pulses contain 2 or more photons. If the pulse contains more than one photon, then Eve can split off the extra photons and transmit the remaining single photon to Bob. This is the basis of the photon number splitting attack,[29] where Eve stores these extra photons in a quantum memory until Bob detects the remaining single photon and Alice reveals the encoding basis. Eve can then measure her photons in the correct basis and obtain information on the key without introducing detectable errors.

Even with the possibility of a PNS attack a secure key can still be generated, as shown in the GLLP security proof,[30] however a much higher amount of privacy amplification is needed reducing the secure key rate significantly (with PNS the rate scales as {\displaystyle t^{2}} as compared to {\displaystyle t} for a single photon sources, where {\displaystyle t} is the transmittance of the quantum channel).

There are several solutions to this problem. The most obvious is to use a true single photon source instead of an attenuated laser. While such sources are still at a developmental stage QKD has been carried out successfully with them.[31] However, as current sources operate at a low efficiency and frequency key rates and transmission distances are limited. Another solution is to modify the BB84 protocol, as is done for example in the SARG04 protocol,[32] in which the secure key rate scales as {\displaystyle t^{3/2}} . The most promising solution is the decoy state protocol,[33][34][35] in which Alice randomly sends some of her laser pulses with a lower average photon number. These decoy states can be used to detect a PNS attack, as Eve has no way to tell which pulses are signal and which decoy. Using this idea the secure key rate scales as {\displaystyle t} , the same as for a single photon source. This idea has been implemented successfully first at the University of Toronto,[36][37] and in several follow-up QKD experiments,[38] allowing for high key rates secure against all known attacks.

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Advertisement Log in Menu Find a journal Publish with us Track your research Search Cart Home Quantum Private Communication Chapter Quantum Key Distribution Chapter pp 103–134 Cite this chapter Quantum Private Communication 333 Accesses Abstract

The key management which is associated with the key generation, key distribution, key storage, and key updating has become an important issue in the private communication. This chapter introduces a novel approach of generating and distributing key-pair via quantum ways. The aim is to illustrate how to obtain secure keys via quantum key distribution (QKD) techniques. Four modules, i.e., the quantum coding, quantum transmission, eavesdropping detection and key distillation, of a QKD procedure are described. In addition, a security model for the QKD is established.

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(2010). Quantum Key Distribution.

In: Quantum Private Communication. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03296-7_4

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