Article: San Gabriel, California, U.S.
Heidelberg, Germany
American Cemetery and Memorial, Luxembourg City
Patton as a lieutenant general.
"Bandito""Old Blood and Guts""The Old Man"
United States Military Academy
General Cavalry Branch
Seventh United States ArmyThird United States ArmyFifteenth United States Army 304th Tank Brigade3rd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry5th Cavalry Regiment3d Cavalry Regiment2nd Brigade, 2nd Armored Division2nd Armored DivisionI Armored CorpsDesert Training CenterII Corps
Mexican Revolution
Battle of San Miguelito
World War I Saint Mihiel Campaign Meuse-Argonne Campaign World War II Algeria-French Morocco Campaign North African Campaign Tunisia Campaign Sicily Campaign Lorraine Campaign Ardennes Campaign Rhineland Campaign Central Europe Campaign
Distinguished Service Cross (2)Distinguished Service Medal (3)Silver Star (2)Legion of MeritBronze StarPurple HeartComplete list of decorations</center>
George Patton IV (son)John K. Waters (son-in-law)
General George Smith Patton Jr. (November 11, 1885 – December 21, 1945) was a senior officer of the United States Army, who commanded the United States Seventh Army in the Mediterranean and European theaters of World War II, but is best known for his leadership of the United States Third Army in France and Germany following the Allied invasion of Normandy in June 1944.
Born in 1885 to a family with an extensive military background (with members serving in the United States Army and Confederate States Army), Patton attended the Virginia Military Institute, and later the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. He participated in the 1912 Olympic modern pentathlon, where he placed fifth. After the Olympics Patton studied fencing in France, and designed the M1913 Cavalry Saber, more commonly known as the "Patton Sword." The War Department ordered 20,000 of them in 1913. Later the same year Patton was assigned as a student and "Master of the Sword," the top instructor in a new course in swordsmanship, at the Mounted Service School in Fort Riley, Kansas. It was here he wrote "Saber Exercise 1914," using easy-to-follow steps accompanied by detailed illustrations. The following year he wrote a more informal guide, "Diary of the Instructor in Swordsmanship," at the request of his students who wanted more detailed training guidance. Patton first saw combat during the Pancho Villa Expedition in 1916, taking part in America's first military action using motor vehicles. He later joined the newly formed United States Tank Corps of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) and saw action in World War I, commanding the U.S. tank school in France before being wounded while leading tanks into combat near the end of the war. In the interwar period, Patton remained a central figure in the development of armored warfare doctrine in the U.S. Army, serving in numerous staff positions throughout the country. Rising through the ranks, he commanded the 2nd Armored Division at the time of the American entry into World War II.
Patton led U.S. troops into the Mediterranean theater with an invasion of Casablanca during Operation Torch in 1942, where he later established himself as an effective commander through his rapid rehabilitation of the demoralized U.S. II Corps. He commanded the U.S. Seventh Army during the Allied invasion of Sicily, where he was the first Allied commander to reach Messina. There he was embroiled in controversy after he slapped two shell-shocked soldiers under his command, and was temporarily removed from battlefield command for other duties such as participating in Operation Fortitude's disinformation campaign for Operation Overlord. Patton returned to command the Third Army following the invasion of Normandy in June 1944, where he led a highly successful rapid armored drive across France. He led the relief of beleaguered American troops at Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge, and advanced his Third Army into Nazi Germany by the end of the war.
After the war, Patton became the military governor of Bavaria, but he was relieved of this post because of his statements on denazification. He commanded the United States Fifteenth Army for slightly more than two months. Patton died in Germany on December 21, 1945, as a result of injuries from an automobile accident twelve days earlier.
Patton's colorful image, hard-driving personality and success as a commander were at times overshadowed by his controversial public statements, including private racist and antisemitic remarks. His philosophy of leading from the front and his ability to inspire troops with vulgarity-ridden speeches, such as a famous address to the Third Army, attracted favorable attention. His strong emphasis on rapid and aggressive offensive action proved effective. While Allied leaders held sharply differing opinions on Patton, he was regarded highly by his opponents in the German High Command. A popular, award-winning biographical film released in 1970 helped transform Patton into an American folk hero.
Early life
Patton was born on November 11, 1885, in San Gabriel, California, to George Smith Patton Sr. and his wife Ruth Wilson. Patton had a younger sister, Anne. The family was of Irish, Scots-Irish, English, and Welsh ancestry. His great grandmother came from an aristocratic Welsh family, descended from many Welsh lords of Glamorgan, which had an extensive military background. Patton believed he had former lives as a soldier and took pride in mystical ties with his ancestors. Though not directly descended from George Washington, Patton traced some of his English colonial roots to George Washington's great-grandfather. He was also descended from England's King Edward I through Edward's son Edmund of Woodstock, 1st Earl of Kent. Family belief held the Pattons were descended from sixteen barons who had signed the Magna Carta.
Patton also descended from Hugh Mercer, who had been killed in the Battle of Princeton during the American Revolution. Patton's paternal grandfather was Colonel George Smith Patton, who commanded the Confederate 22nd Virginia Infantry under Jubal Early in the Civil War and was killed in the Third Battle of Winchester, while his great uncle Colonel Waller T. Patton was killed while leading the Confederate 7th Virginia Infantry in Pickett's Charge during the Battle of Gettysburg. Patton's father graduated from the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), became a lawyer and later the district attorney of Los Angeles County. Patton's maternal grandfather was Benjamin Davis Wilson, who had been Mayor of Los Angeles and a successful merchant. The family was prosperous, and George Patton spent his childhood on the family's estate.
As a child, Patton had difficulty learning to read and write, but eventually overcame this and was known in his adult life to be an avid reader. Historians Carlo D'Este and Alan Axelrod note in their biographies of Patton that these difficulties were likely the result of undiagnosed dyslexia. He was tutored from home until the age of eleven, when he was enrolled in Stephen Clark's School for Boys, a private school in Pasadena, for six years. Patton was described as an intelligent boy and was widely read on classical military history, particularly the exploits of Hannibal, Scipio Africanus, Julius Caesar, Joan of Arc, and Napoleon Bonaparte, as well as family friend John Singleton Mosby, who frequently stopped by the Patton family home when George S. Patton was a child. He was also a devoted horseback rider.
During a family summer trip to Catalina Island in 1902, Patton met Beatrice Banning Ayer, the daughter of Boston industrialist Frederick Ayer. The two wed on May 26, 1910 in Beverly Farms, Massachusetts. They had three children, Beatrice Smith (born March 1911), Ruth Ellen (born February 1915), and George Patton IV (born December 1923). George S. Patton Jr. considered his son to be the fourth generation to carry the name, following George Hugh Smith and George Smith Patton Sr.
Patton never seriously considered a career other than the military. At the age of seventeen he wrote a letter to Senator Thomas R. Bard, seeking an appointment to the United States Military Academy. Bard required Patton to complete an entrance exam. Fearing a poor performance, Patton and his father applied to several universities with Reserve Officer's Training Corps programs. Patton was accepted to Princeton University but eventually decided on the Virginia Military Institute. He attended VMI from 1903 to 1904 and struggled with reading and writing but performed exceptionally in uniform and appearance inspection as well as military drill, earning the admiration of fellow cadets and the respect of upperclassmen. While at VMI, Patton became a member of the Kappa Alpha Order fraternity. On March 3, 1904, after Patton continued letter-writing and good performance in the entrance exam, Bard recommended him for West Point.
In his plebe year at West Point, Patton adjusted easily to the routine. Still, his academic performance was so poor that he was forced to repeat his first year after failing mathematics. Studying throughout his summer break, Patton returned and showed substantial academic improvement. For the remainder of his career at the academy, Patton excelled at military drills though his academic performance remained average. He was cadet sergeant major his junior year, and cadet adjutant his senior year. He also joined the football team but injured his arm and ceased playing on several occasions, instead trying out for the Sword Team and track and field, quickly becoming one of the best swordsmen at the academy. Patton graduated from the academy ranked 46 out of 103. He graduated from West Point on June 11, 1909 and was commissioned as a second lieutenant in the cavalry .
Junior officer
Patton's first posting was with the 15th Cavalry at Fort Sheridan, Illinois, where he established himself as a hard-driving leader who impressed superiors with his dedication. In late 1911, Patton was transferred to Fort Myer, Virginia, where many of the Army's senior leaders were stationed. Befriending Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson, Patton served as his aide at social functions on top of his regular duties as quartermaster for his troop.
1912 Olympics
For his skill with running and fencing, Patton was selected as the Army's entry for the first modern pentathlon at the 1912 Olympic Games in Stockholm, Sweden. Of 42 competitors, Patton placed twenty-first on the pistol range, seventh in swimming, fourth in fencing, sixth in the equestrian competition, and third in the footrace, finishing fifth overall and first among the non-Swedish competitors. There was some controversy concerning his performance in the pistol shooting competition, where he used a .38 caliber pistol while most of the other competitors chose .22 caliber firearms. He claimed that the holes in the paper from his early shots were so large that some of his later bullets passed through them, but the judges decided he missed the target completely once. Modern competitions on this level frequently now employ a moving background to specifically track multiple shots through the same hole. If his assertion was correct, Patton would likely have won an Olympic medal in the event. The judges' ruling was upheld. Patton's only comment on the matter was:
The high spirit of sportsmanship and generosity manifested throughout speaks volumes for the character of the officers of the present day. There was not a single incident of a protest or any unsportsmanlike quibbling or fighting for points which I may say, marred some of the other civilian competitions at the Olympic Games. Each man did his best and took what fortune sent them like a true soldier, and at the end we all felt more like good friends and comrades than rivals in a severe competition, yet this spirit of friendship in no manner detracted from the zeal with which all strove for success.
Sword design
Following the 1912 Olympics, Patton traveled to Saumur, France, where he learned fencing techniques from Adjutant Charles Cléry, a French "master of arms" and instructor of fencing at the cavalry school there. Bringing these lessons back to Fort Meyer, Patton redesigned saber combat doctrine for the U.S. cavalry, favoring thrusting attacks over the standard slashing maneuver and designing a new sword for such attacks. He was temporarily assigned to the Office of the Army Chief of Staff, and in 1913, the first 20,000 of the Model 1913 Cavalry Saber—popularly known as the "Patton sword"—were ordered. Patton then returned to Saumur to learn advanced techniques before bringing his skills to the Mounted Service School at Fort Riley, Kansas, where he would be both a student and a fencing instructor. He was the first Army officer to be designated "Master of the Sword," a title denoting the school's top instructor in swordsmanship. Arriving in September 1913, he taught fencing to other cavalry officers, many of whom were senior to him in rank. Patton graduated from this school in June 1915. He was originally intended to return to the 15th Cavalry, which was bound for the Philippines. Fearing this assignment would dead-end his career, Patton traveled to Washington, D.C. during 11 days of leave and convinced influential friends to arrange a reassignment for him to the 8th Cavalry at Fort Bliss, Texas, anticipating that instability in Mexico might boil over into a full-scale civil war. In the meantime, Patton was selected to participate in the 1916 Summer Olympics, but that olympiad was cancelled due to World War I.
Pancho Villa Expedition
In 1915 Patton was assigned to border patrol duty with A Company of the 8th Cavalry, based in Sierra Blanca. During his time in the town, Patton took to wearing his M1911 Colt .45 in his belt rather than a holster. His firearm discharged accidentally one night in a saloon, so he swapped it for an ivory-handled Colt Single Action Army revolver, a weapon that would later become an icon of Patton's image. He transferred to Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, for a brief time later in 1915.
In March 1916 Mexican forces loyal to Pancho Villa crossed into New Mexico and raided the border town of Columbus. The violence in Columbus killed several Americans. In response, the U.S. launched a punitive expedition into Mexico against Villa. Chagrined to discover that his unit would not participate, Patton appealed to expedition commander John J. Pershing, and was named his personal aide for the expedition. This meant Patton would have some role in organizing the effort, and his eagerness and dedication to the task impressed Pershing. Patton modeled much of his leadership style after Pershing, who favored strong, decisive actions and commanding from the front. As an aide, Patton oversaw the logistics of Pershing's transportation and acted as his personal courier.
In mid-April, Patton asked Pershing for the opportunity to command troops, and was attached to Troop C of the 13th Cavalry to assist in the manhunt for Villa and his subordinates. His initial combat experience came on May 14, 1916 in what would become the first motorized attack in the history of U.S. warfare. A force under his command of ten soldiers and two civilian guides with the 6th Infantry in three Dodge touring cars surprised three of Villa's men during a foraging expedition, killing Julio Cárdenas and two of his guards. It was not clear if Patton personally killed any of the men, but he was known to have wounded all three. The incident garnered Patton both Pershing's good favor and widespread media attention as a "bandit killer." Shortly after, he was promoted to first lieutenant while a part of the 10th Cavalry on May 23, 1916. Patton remained in Mexico until the end of the year. President Woodrow Wilson forbade the expedition from conducting aggressive patrols deeper into Mexico, so it remained encamped for much of that time. In October Patton briefly retired to California after being burned by an exploding gas lamp. He returned from the expedition permanently in February 1917.
World War I
After the Villa Expedition, Patton was detailed to Front Royal, Virginia, to oversee horse procurement for the Army, but Pershing intervened on his behalf. After the United States entered World War I, and Pershing was named commander of the American Expeditionary Force (AEF) on the Western Front, Patton requested to join his staff. Patton was promoted to captain on May 15, 1917 and left for Europe, among the 180 men of Pershing's advance party which departed May 28 and arrived in Liverpool, England, on June 8. Taken as Pershing's personal aide, Patton oversaw the training of American troops in Paris, France, until September, then moved to Chaumont and assigned as a post adjutant, commanding the headquarters company overseeing the base. Patton was dissatisfied with the post and began to take an interest in tanks, as Pershing sought to give him command of an infantry battalion. While in a hospital for jaundice, Patton met Colonel Fox Conner, who encouraged him to work with tanks over infantry.
On November 10, 1917 Patton was assigned to establish the AEF Light Tank School. He left Paris and reported to the French Army's tank training school at Champlieu near Orrouy, where he drove a Renault FT light tank. On November 20, the British launched an offensive towards the important rail center of Cambrai, using an unprecedented number of tanks. At the conclusion of his tour on December 1, Patton went to Albert, from Cambrai, to be briefed on the results of this attack by the chief of staff of the British Tank Corps, Colonel J. F. C. Fuller. On the way back to Paris, he visited the Renault factory to observe the tanks being manufactured. Patton was promoted to major on January 26, 1918. He received the first ten tanks on March 23, 1918 at the Tank School at Langres, Haute-Marne département. The only soldier with tank-driving experience, Patton personally backed seven of the tanks off the train. In the post, Patton trained tank crews to operate in support of infantry, and promoted its acceptance among reluctant infantry officers. He was promoted to lieutenant colonel on April 3, 1918, and attended the Command and General Staff College in Langres.
In August 1918, he was placed in charge of the U.S. 1st Provisional Tank Brigade (re-designated the 304th Tank Brigade on November 6, 1918). Patton's Light Tank Brigade was part of Colonel Samuel Rockenbach's Tank Corps, part of the American First Army. Personally overseeing the logistics of the tanks in their first combat use by U.S. forces, and reconnoitering the target area for their first attack himself, Patton ordered that no U.S. tank be surrendered. Patton commanded American-crewed Renault FT tanks at the Battle of Saint-Mihiel, leading the tanks from the front for much of their attack, which began on September 12. He walked in front of the tanks into the German-held village of Essey, and rode on top of a tank during the attack into Pannes, seeking to inspire his men.
Patton's brigade was then moved to support U.S. I Corps in the Meuse-Argonne Offensive on September 26. He personally led a troop of tanks through thick fog as they advanced into German lines. Around 09:00, Patton was wounded while leading six men and a tank in an attack on German machine guns near the town of Cheppy. His orderly, Private First Class Joe Angelo, saved Patton, for which he was later awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Patton commanded the battle from a shell hole for another hour before being evacuated. He stopped at a rear command post to submit his report before heading to a hospital. Sereno E. Brett, commander of the U.S. 326th Tank Battalion, took command of the brigade in Patton's absence. Patton wrote in a letter to his wife: "The bullet went into the front of my left leg and came out just at the crack of my bottom about two inches to the left of my rectum. It was fired at about 50 m so made a hole about the size of a [silver] dollar where it came out."
While recuperating from his wound, Patton was promoted to colonel in the Tank Corps of the U.S. National Army on October 17. He returned to duty on October 28 but saw no further action before hostilities ended with the armistice of November 11, 1918. For his actions in Cheppy, Patton received the Distinguished Service Cross. For his leadership of the brigade and tank school, he was awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. He was also awarded the Purple Heart for his combat wounds after the decoration was created in 1932.
Inter-war years
Patton left France for New York City on March 2, 1919. After the war he was assigned to Camp Meade, Maryland, and reverted to his permanent rank of captain on June 30, 1920, though he was promoted to major again the next day. Patton was given temporary duty in Washington D.C. that year to serve on a committee writing a manual on tank operations. During this time he developed a belief that tanks should be used not as infantry support, but rather as an independent fighting force. Patton supported the M1919 tank design created by J. Walter Christie, a project which was shelved due to financial considerations. While on duty in Washington, D.C., in 1919, Patton met Dwight D. Eisenhower, who would play an enormous role in Patton's future career. During and following Patton's assignment in Hawaii, he and Eisenhower corresponded frequently. Patton sent Eisenhower notes and assistance to help him graduate from the General Staff College. With Christie, Eisenhower, and a handful of other officers, Patton pushed for more development of armored warfare in the interwar era. These thoughts resonated with Secretary of War Dwight Davis, but the limited military budget and prevalence of already-established Infantry and Cavalry branches meant the U.S. would not develop its armored corps much until 1940.
On September 30, 1920 he relinquished command of the 304th Tank Brigade and was reassigned to Fort Myer as commander of 3rd Squadron, 3rd Cavalry. Patton, loathing duty as a peacetime staff officer, spent much time writing technical papers and giving speeches on his combat experiences at the General Staff College. In July 1921 Patton became a member of the American Legion Tank Corps Post No. 19. From 1922 to mid-1923 he attended the Field Officer's Course at the Cavalry School at Fort Riley, then he attended the Command and General Staff College from mid-1923 to mid-1924, graduating 25th out of 248. In August 1923, Patton saved several children from drowning when they fell off a yacht during a boating trip off Salem, Massachusetts. He was awarded the Silver Lifesaving Medal for this action. He was temporarily appointed to the General Staff Corps in Boston, Massachusetts, before being reassigned as G-1 and G-2 of the Hawaiian Division at Schofield Barracks in Honolulu in March 1925.
Patton was made G-3 of the Hawaiian Division for several months, before being transferred in May 1927 to the Office of the Chief of Cavalry in Washington, D.C., where he began to develop the concepts of mechanized warfare. A short-lived experiment to merge infantry, cavalry and artillery into a combined arms force was cancelled after U.S. Congress removed funding. Patton left this office in 1931, returned to Massachusetts and attended the Army War College, becoming a "Distinguished Graduate" in June 1932.
In July 1932, Patton was executive officer of the 3rd Cavalry, which was ordered to Washington by Army Chief of Staff General Douglas MacArthur. Patton took command of the 600 troops of the 3rd Cavalry, and on July 28, MacArthur ordered Patton's troops to advance on protesting veterans known as the "Bonus Army" with tear gas and bayonets. Patton was dissatisfied with MacArthur's conduct, as he recognized the legitimacy of the veterans' complaints and had himself earlier refused to issue the order to employ armed force to disperse the veterans. Patton later stated that, though he found the duty "most distasteful", he also felt that putting the marchers down prevented an insurrection and saved lives and property. He personally led the 3rd Cavalry down Pennsylvania Avenue, dispersing the protesters. Patton also encountered his former orderly as one of the marchers and forcibly ordered him away, fearing such a meeting might make the headlines.
Patton was promoted to lieutenant colonel in the regular Army on March 1, 1934, and was transferred to the Hawaiian Division in early 1935 to serve as G-2. Patton followed the growing hostility and conquest aspirations, of the militant Japanese leadership. He wrote a plan to intern the Japanese living in the islands in the event of an attack, as a result of the atrocities carried out by Japanese on the Chinese in the Sino-Japanese war. In 1937, he wrote a paper with the title "Surprise" which predicted, with what D'Este termed "chilling accuracy," a surprise attack by the Japanese on Hawaii. Depressed at the lack of prospects for new conflict, Patton took to drinking heavily and began a brief affair with his 21-year-old niece by marriage, Jean Gordon.
Patton continued playing polo and sailing in this time. After sailing back to Los Angeles for extended leave in 1937, he was kicked by a horse and fractured his leg. Patton developed phlebitis from the injury, which nearly killed him. The incident almost forced Patton out of active service, but a six-month administrative assignment in the Academic Department at the Cavalry School at Fort Riley helped him to recover. Patton was promoted to colonel on July 24, 1938 and given command of the 5th Cavalry at Fort Clark, Texas, for six months, a post he relished, but he was reassigned to Fort Myer again in December as commander of the 3rd Cavalry. There, he met Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall, who was so impressed with him that Marshall considered Patton a prime candidate for promotion to general. In peacetime, though, he would remain a colonel to remain eligible to command a regiment.
World War II
Following the German Army's invasion of Poland and the outbreak of World War II in Europe in September 1939, the U.S. military entered a period of mobilization, and Patton sought to build up the power of U.S. armored forces. During maneuvers the Third Army conducted in 1940, Patton served as an umpire, where he met Adna R. Chaffee Jr. and the two formulated recommendations to develop an armored force. Chaffee was named commander of this force, and created the 1st and 2nd Armored Divisions as well as the first combined arms doctrine. He named Patton commander of the 2nd Armored Brigade, part of the 2nd Armored Division. The division was one of few organized as a heavy formation with many tanks, and Patton was in charge of its training. Patton was promoted to brigadier general on October 2, made acting division commander in November, and on April 4, 1941 was promoted again to major general and made Commanding General (CG) of the 2nd Armored Division. As Chaffee stepped down from command of the I Armored Corps, Patton became the most prominent figure in U.S. armor doctrine. In December 1940, he staged a high-profile mass exercise in which 1,000 tanks and vehicles were driven from Columbus, Georgia, to Panama City, Florida, and back. He repeated the exercise with his entire division of 1,300 vehicles the next month. Patton earned a pilot's license and, during these maneuvers, observed the movements of his vehicles from the air to find ways to deploy them effectively in combat. His exploits earned him a spot on the cover of Life Magazine.
Patton led the division during the Tennessee Maneuvers in June 1941, and was lauded for his leadership, executing 48 hours' worth of planned objectives in only nine. During the September Louisiana Maneuvers, his division was part of the losing Red Army in Phase I, but in Phase II was assigned to the Blue Army. His division executed a end run around the Red Army and "captured" Shreveport, Louisiana. During the October–November Carolina Maneuvers, Patton's division captured Hugh Drum, commander of the opposing army. On January 15, 1942 he was given command of I Armored Corps, and the next month established the Desert Training Center in the Imperial Valley to run training exercises. He commenced these exercises in late 1941 and continued them into the summer of 1942. Patton chose a expanse of desert area about southeast of Palm Springs. From his first days as a commander, Patton strongly emphasized the need for armored forces to stay in constant contact with opposing forces. His instinctive preference for offensive movement was typified by an answer Patton gave to war correspondents in a 1944 press conference. In response to a question on whether the Third Army's rapid offensive across France should be slowed to reduce the number of U.S. casualties, Patton replied, "Whenever you slow anything down, you waste human lives." It was around this time that a reporter, after hearing a speech where Patton said that it took "blood and brains" to win in combat, began calling him "blood and guts." The nickname would follow him for the rest of his life. Soldiers under his command at were known at times quipped, "our blood, his guts". Nonetheless, he was known to be admired widely by the men under his charge. Patton was also known simply as "The Old Man" among his troops.
North African Campaign
Under General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Patton was assigned to help plan the Allied invasion of French North Africa as part of Operation Torch in the summer of 1942. Patton commanded the Western Task Force, consisting of 33,000 men in 100 ships, in landings centered on Casablanca, Morocco. The landings, which took place on November 8, 1942, were opposed by Vichy French forces, but Patton's men quickly gained a beachhead and pushed through fierce resistance. Casablanca fell on November 11 and Patton negotiated an armistice with French General Charles Noguès. The Sultan of Morocco was so impressed that he presented Patton with the Order of Ouissam Alaouite, with the citation "Les Lions dans leurs tanières tremblent en le voyant approcher" (The lions in their dens tremble at his approach). Patton oversaw the conversion of Casablanca into a military port and hosted the Casablanca Conference in January 1943.
On March 6, 1943, following the defeat of the U.S. II Corps by the German Afrika Korps, commanded by Generalfeldmarschall Erwin Rommel, at the Battle of Kasserine Pass, Patton replaced Major General Lloyd Fredendall as Commanding General of the II Corps and was promoted to lieutenant general. Soon thereafter, he had Omar Bradley reassigned to his corps as its deputy commander. With orders to take the battered and demoralized formation into action in 10 days' time, Patton immediately introduced sweeping changes, ordering all soldiers to wear clean, pressed and complete uniforms, establishing rigorous schedules, and requiring strict adherence to military protocol. He continuously moved throughout the command talking with men, seeking to shape them into effective soldiers. He pushed them hard, and sought to reward them well for their accomplishments. His uncompromising leadership style is evidenced by his orders for an attack on a hill position near Gafsa which are reported to have ended "I expect to see such casualties among officers, particularly staff officers, as will convince me that a serious effort has been made to capture this objective."
Patton's training was effective, and on March 17, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division took Gafsa, winning the Battle of El Guettar, and pushing a German and Italian armored force back twice. In the meantime, on April 5, he removed Major General Orlando Ward, the commander of the 1st Armored Division, after its lackluster performance at Maknassy against numerically inferior German forces. Advancing on Gabès, Patton's corps pressured the Mareth Line. During this time, he reported to British Army commander Harold Alexander, and came into conflict with Air Vice Marshal Arthur Coningham about the lack of close air support being provided for his troops. When Coningham dispatched three officers to Patton's headquarters to persuade him that the British were providing ample air support, they came under German air attack mid-meeting, and part of the ceiling of Patton's office collapsed around them. Speaking later of the German pilots who had struck, Patton remarked, "if I could find the sons of bitches who flew those planes, I'd mail each of them a medal." By the time his force reached Gabès, the Germans had abandoned it. He then relinquished command of II Corps to Bradley, and returned to the I Armored Corps in Casablanca to help plan Operation Husky. Fearing U.S. troops would be sidelined, he convinced British commanders to allow them to continue fighting through to the end of the Tunisia Campaign before leaving on this new assignment.
Sicily Campaign
For Operation Husky, the invasion of Sicily, Patton was to command the Seventh United States Army, dubbed the Western Task Force, in landings at Gela, Scoglitti and Licata to support landings by Bernard Montgomery's British Eighth Army. Patton's I Armored Corps was officially redesignated the Seventh Army just before his force of 90,000 landed before dawn on D-Day, July 10, 1943, on beaches near the town of Licata. The armada was hampered by wind and weather, but despite this the three U.S. infantry divisions involved, the 3rd, 1st, and 45th, secured their respective beaches. They then repulsed counterattacks at Gela, where Patton personally led his troops against German reinforcements from the Hermann Göring Division.
Initially ordered to protect the British forces' left flank, Patton was granted permission by Alexander to take Palermo after Montgomery's forces became bogged down on the road to Messina. As part of a provisional corps under Major General Geoffrey Keyes, the 3rd Infantry Division under Major General Lucian Truscott covered in 72 hours, arriving at Palermo on July 21. He then set his sights on Messina. He sought an amphibious assault, but it was delayed by lack of landing craft, and his troops did not land at Santo Stefano until August 8, by which time the Germans and Italians had already evacuated the bulk of their troops to mainland Italy. He ordered more landings on August 10 by the 3rd Infantry Division, which took heavy casualties but pushed the German forces back, and hastened the advance on Messina. A third landing was completed on August 16, and by 22:00 that day Messina fell to his forces. By the end of the battle, the 200,000-man Seventh Army had suffered 7,500 casualties, and killed or captured 113,000 Axis troops and destroyed 3,500 vehicles. Still, 40,000 German and 70,000 Italian troops escaped to Italy with 10,000 vehicles.
Patton's conduct in this campaign met with several controversies. When Alexander sent a transmission on July 19 limiting Patton's attack on Messina, his chief of staff, Brigadier General Hobart R. Gay, claimed the message was "lost in transmission" until Messina had fallen. On July 22 he shot and killed a pair of mules that had stopped while pulling a cart across a bridge. The cart was blocking the way of a U.S. armored column which was under attack from German aircraft. When their Sicilian owner protested, Patton attacked him with a walking stick and pushed the two mules off of the bridge. When informed of the massacre of Italian prisoners at Biscari by troops under his command, Patton wrote in his diary, "I told Bradley that it was probably an exaggeration, but in any case to tell the officer to certify that the dead men were snipers or had attempted to escape or something, as it would make a stink in the press and also would make the civilians mad. Anyhow, they are dead, so nothing can be done about it." Bradley refused Patton's suggestions. Patton later changed his mind. After he learned that the 45th Division's Inspector General found "no provocation on the part of the prisoners . . . . They had been slaughtered" Patton is reported to have said: "Try the bastards".
Patton also came into frequent disagreements with Terry de la Mesa Allen Sr. and Theodore Roosevelt Jr. and acquiesced to their relief by Bradley.
Slapping incidents and aftermath
George S. Patton slapping incidents
Two high-profile incidents of Patton striking subordinates during the Sicily campaign attracted national controversy following the end of the campaign. On August 3, 1943, Patton slapped and verbally abused Private Charles H. Kuhl at an evacuation hospital in Nicosia after he had been found to suffer from "battle fatigue". On August 10, Patton slapped Private Paul G. Bennett under similar circumstances. Ordering both soldiers back to the front lines, Patton railed against cowardice and issued orders to his commanders to discipline any soldier making similar complaints.
Word of the incident reached Eisenhower, who privately reprimanded Patton and insisted he apologize. Patton apologized to both soldiers individually, as well as to doctors who witnessed the incidents, and later to all of the soldiers under his command in several speeches. Eisenhower suppressed the incident in the media, but in November journalist Drew Pearson revealed it on his radio program. Criticism of Patton in the United States was harsh, and included members of Congress and former generals, Pershing among them. The views of the general public remained mixed on the matter, and eventually Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson stated that Patton must be retained as a commander because of the need for his "aggressive, winning leadership in the bitter battles which are to come before final victory."
Patton did not command a force in combat for 11 months. In September, Bradley, who was Patton's junior in both rank and experience, was selected to command the First United States Army forming in England to prepare for Operation Overlord. This decision had been made before the slapping incidents were made public, but Patton blamed them for his being denied the command. Eisenhower felt the invasion of Europe was too important to risk any uncertainty, and the slapping incidents had been an example of Patton's inability to exercise discipline and self-control. While Eisenhower and Marshall both considered Patton to be a skilled combat commander, they felt Bradley was less impulsive or prone to making mistakes. On January 26, 1944 Patton was formally given command of the Third United States Army in England, a newly arrived unit, and assigned to prepare its inexperienced soldiers for combat in Europe. This duty kept Patton busy in early 1944 preparing for the pending invasion.
Phantom Army
The German High Command had more respect for Patton than for any other Allied commander and considered him central to any plan to invade Europe from the United Kingdom. Because of this, Patton was made a prominent figure in the deception operation, Fortitude, in early 1944. The Allies fed German spies a steady stream of false intelligence that Patton had been named commander of the First United States Army Group (FUSAG) and was preparing this command for an invasion of Pas de Calais. The FUSAG command was in reality an intricately constructed "phantom" army of decoys, props, and fake signals traffic based around Dover to mislead German aircraft and to make Axis leaders believe a large force was massing there to mask the real location of the invasion in Normandy. Patton was ordered to keep a low profile to deceive the Germans into thinking he was in Dover throughout early 1944, when he was actually training the Third Army. As a result of Operation Fortitude, the German 15th Army remained at Pas de Calais to defend against Patton's supposed attack. This formation held its position even after the invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944. Patton flew into France a month later and returned to combat duty.
Normandy breakout offensive
Sailing to Normandy throughout July, Patton's Third Army formed on the extreme right (west) of the Allied land forces. Patton's friend Gilbert R. Cook was his deputy commander, whom Patton later had to relieve due to illness, a decision which "shook him to the core." Patton's Third Army became operational at noon on August 1, 1944, under Bradley's Twelfth United States Army Group. The Third Army simultaneously attacked west into Brittany, south, east toward the Seine, and north, assisting in trapping several hundred thousand German soldiers in the Falaise Pocket between Falaise and Argentan.
Patton's strategy with his army favored speed and aggressive offensive action, though his forces saw less opposition than did the other three Allied field armies in the initial weeks of its advance. The Third Army typically employed forward scout units to determine enemy strength and positions. Self-propelled artillery moved with the spearhead units and was sited well forward, ready to engage protected German positions with indirect fire. Light aircraft such as the Piper L-4 Cub served as artillery spotters and provided airborne reconnaissance. Once located, the armored infantry would attack using tanks as infantry support. Other armored units would then break through enemy lines and exploit any subsequent breach, constantly pressuring withdrawing German forces to prevent them from regrouping and reforming a cohesive defensive line. The U.S. armor advanced using reconnaissance by fire, and the .50 caliber M2 Browning heavy machine gun proved effective in this role, often flushing out and killing German panzerfaust teams waiting in ambush as well as breaking up German infantry assaults against the armored infantry.
The speed of the advance forced Patton's units to rely heavily on air reconnaissance and tactical air support. The Third Army had by far more military intelligence (G-2) officers at headquarters specifically designated to coordinate air strikes than any other army. Its attached close air support group was XIX Tactical Air Command, commanded by Brigadier General Otto P. Weyland. Developed originally by General Elwood Quesada of IX Tactical Air Command for the First Army in Operation Cobra, the technique of "armored column cover", in which close air support was directed by an air traffic controller in one of the attacking tanks, was used extensively by the Third Army. Each column was protected by a standing patrol of three to four P-47 and P-51 fighter-bombers as a combat air patrol (CAP).
In its advance from Avranches to Argentan, the Third Army traversed in just two weeks. Patton's force was supplemented by Ultra intelligence for which he was briefed daily by his G-2, Colonel Oscar W. Koch, who apprised him of German counterattacks, and where to concentrate his forces. Equally important to the advance of Third Army columns in northern France was the rapid advance of the supply echelons. Third Army logistics were overseen by Colonel Walter J. Muller, Patton's G-4, who emphasized flexibility, improvisation, and adaptation for Third Army supply echelons so forward units could rapidly exploit a breakthrough. Patton's rapid drive to Lorraine demonstrated his keen appreciation for the technological advantages of the U.S. Army. The major U.S. and Allied advantages were in mobility and air superiority. The U.S. Army had more trucks, more reliable tanks, and better radio communications, all of which contributed to a superior ability to operate at a rapid offensive pace.
Lorraine Campaign
Patton's offensive came to a halt on August 31, 1944, as the Third Army ran out of fuel near the Moselle River, just outside Metz. Patton expected that the theater commander would keep fuel and supplies flowing to support successful advances, but Eisenhower favored a "broad front" approach to the ground-war effort, believing that a single thrust would have to drop off flank protection, and would quickly lose its punch. Still within the constraints of a very large effort overall, Eisenhower gave Montgomery and his Twenty First Army Group a higher priority for supplies for Operation Market Garden. Combined with other demands on the limited resource pool, this resulted in the Third Army exhausting its fuel supplies. Patton believed his forces were close enough to the Siegfried Line that he remarked to Bradley that with 400,000 gallons of gasoline he could be in Germany within two days. In late September, a large German Panzer counterattack sent expressly to stop the advance of Patton's Third Army was defeated by the U.S. 4th Armored Division at the Battle of Arracourt. Despite the victory, the Third Army stayed in place as a result of Eisenhower's order. The German commanders believed this was because their counterattack had been successful.
The halt of the Third Army during the month of September was enough to allow the Germans to strengthen the fortress of Metz. In October and November, the Third Army was mired in a near-stalemate with the Germans during the Battle of Metz, with heavy casualties on both sides. An attempt by Patton to seize Fort Driant just south of Metz was defeated. By mid-November, however, Metz had fallen to the Americans. Patton's decisions in taking this city were criticized. German commanders interviewed after the war noted he could have bypassed the city and moved north to Luxembourg where he would have been able to cut off the German Seventh Army. The German commander of Metz, General Hermann Balck, also noted that a more direct attack would have resulted in a more decisive Allied victory in the city. Historian Carlo D'Este later wrote that the Lorraine Campaign was one of Patton's least successful, faulting him for not deploying his divisions more aggressively and decisively. A 1985 US Army study of the Lorraine Campaign was highly critical of Patton. The document states:
"Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be considered First-rate troops. Third Army encountered whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and others consisting entirety of soldiers with stomach ulcers."
"Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine would fall quickly, and unless the war ended first, Patton's tanks would take the war into Germany by summer's end. But Lorraine was not to be overrun in a lightning campaign. Instead, the battle for Lorraine would drag on for more than 3 months."
"Moreover, once Third Army penetrated the province and entered Germany, there would still be no first-rate military objectives within its grasp. The Saar industrial region, while significant, was of secondary importance when compared to the great Ruhr industrial complex farther north."
"Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory' From September through November, Third Army claimed to have inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties, approximately one-third of the total number of casualties it sustained in the entire European war."
"Ironically, Third Army never used Lorraine as a springboard for an advance into Germany after all. Patton turned most of the sector over to Seventh Army during the Ardennes crisis, and when the eastward advance resumed after the Battle of the Bulge, Third Army based its operations on Luxembourg, not Lorraine. The Lorraine campaign will always remain a controversial episode in American military history."
"Finally the Lorraine Campaign demonstrated that Logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful and aggressive the commanding general may be."
"His discovered that violating logistical principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter."''''
The US Army study highlighted Patton's tendency to overstretch his supply lines.
With supplies low and priority given to Montgomery until the port of Antwerp could be opened, Patton remained frustrated at the lack of progress of his forces. From November 8 to December 15, his army advanced no more than .
Battle of the Bulge
In December 1944, the German army, under the command of German Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt, launched a last-ditch offensive across Belgium, Luxembourg, and northeastern France. On December 16, 1944, it massed 29 divisions totaling 250,000 men at a weak point in the Allied lines, and during the early stages of the ensuing Battle of the Bulge, made significant headway towards the Meuse River during the worst winter Europe had seen in years. Eisenhower called a meeting of all senior Allied commanders on the Western Front to a headquarters near Verdun on the morning of December 19 to plan strategy and a response to the German assault.
At the time, Patton's Third Army was engaged in heavy fighting near Saarbrücken. Guessing the intent of the Allied command meeting, Patton ordered his staff to make three separate operational contingency orders to disengage elements of the Third Army from its present position and begin offensive operations toward several objectives in the area of the bulge occupied by German forces. At the Supreme Command conference, Eisenhower led the meeting, which was attended by Patton, Bradley, General Jacob Devers, Major General Kenneth Strong, Deputy Supreme Commander Air Chief Marshal Arthur Tedder, and several staff officers. When Eisenhower asked Patton how long it would take him to disengage six divisions of his Third Army and commence a counterattack north to relieve the U.S. 101st Airborne Division which had been trapped at Bastogne, Patton replied, "As soon as you're through with me." Patton then clarified that he had already worked up an operational order for a counterattack by three full divisions on December 21, then only 48 hours away. Eisenhower was incredulous: "Don't be fatuous, George. If you try to go that early you won't have all three divisions ready and you'll go piecemeal." Patton replied that his staff already had a contingency operations order ready to go. Still unconvinced, Eisenhower ordered Patton to attack the morning of December 22, using at least three divisions.
Patton left the conference room, phoned his command, and uttered two words: "Play ball." This code phrase initiated a prearranged operational order with Patton's staff, mobilizing three divisions – the 4th Armored Division, the U.S. 80th Infantry Division, and the U.S. 26th Infantry Division – from the Third Army and moving them north toward Bastogne. In all, Patton would reposition six full divisions, U.S. III Corps and U.S. XII Corps, from their positions on the Saar River front along a line stretching from Bastogne to Diekirch and to Echternach. Within a few days, more than 133,000 Third Army vehicles were re-routed into an offensive that covered an average distance of over per vehicle, followed by support echelons carrying of supplies.
On December 21 Patton met with Bradley to review the impending advance, starting the meeting by remarking, "Brad, this time the Kraut's stuck his head in the meat grinder, and I've got hold of the handle." Patton then argued that his Third Army should attack toward Koblenz, cutting off the bulge at the base and trap the entirety of the German armies involved in the offensive. After briefly considering this, Bradley vetoed this proposal, as he was less concerned about killing large numbers of Germans than he was in arranging for the relief of Bastogne before it was overrun. Desiring good weather for his advance, which would permit close ground support by U.S. Army Air Forces tactical aircraft, Patton ordered the Third Army chaplain, Colonel James Hugh O'Neill, to compose a suitable prayer: "Almighty and most merciful Father, we humbly beseech Thee, of Thy great goodness, to restrain these immoderate rains with which we have had to contend. Grant us fair weather for Battle. Graciously hearken to us as soldiers who call upon Thee that, armed with Thy power, we may advance from victory to victory and crush the oppression and wickedness of our enemies, and establish Thy justice among men and nations. Amen." When the weather cleared soon after, Patton awarded O'Neill a Bronze Star Medal on the spot.
On December 26, 1944, the first spearhead units of the Third Army's 4th Armored Division reached Bastogne, opening a corridor for relief and resupply of the besieged forces. Patton's ability to disengage six divisions from front line combat during the middle of winter, then wheel north to relieve Bastogne was one of his most remarkable achievements during the war. He later wrote that the relief of Bastogne was "the most brilliant operation we have thus far performed, and it is in my opinion the outstanding achievement of the war. This is my biggest battle."
Advance into Germany
By February, the Germans were in full retreat. On February 23, 1945, the U.S. 94th Infantry Division crossed the Saar and established a vital bridgehead at Serrig through which Patton pushed units into the Saarland. Patton had insisted upon an immediate crossing of the Saar River against the advice of his officers. Historians such as Charles Whiting have criticized this strategy as unnecessarily aggressive.
Once again, Patton found other commands given priority on gasoline and supplies. To obtain these, Third Army ordnance units passed themselves off as First Army personnel and in one incident they secured thousands of gallons of gasoline from a First Army dump. Between January 29 and March 22, the Third Army took Trier, Coblenz, Bingen, Worms, Mainz, Kaiserslautern, and Ludwigshafen, killing or wounding 99,000 and capturing 140,112 German soldiers, which represented virtually all of the remnants of the German First and Seventh Armies. An example of Patton's sarcastic wit was broadcast when he received orders to by-pass Trier, as it had been decided that four divisions would be needed to capture it. When the message arrived, Trier had already fallen. Patton rather caustically replied: "Have taken Trier with two divisions. Do you want me to give it back?"
The Third Army began crossing the Rhine River after constructing a pontoon bridge on March 22, and he slipped a division across the river that evening. Patton later boasted he had urinated into the river as he crossed.
On March 26, 1945, Patton sent Task Force Baum, consisting of 314 men, 16 tanks, and assorted other vehicles, behind German lines to liberate a prisoner of war camp, OFLAG XIII-B near Hammelburg. Patton knew that one of the inmates was his son-in-law, Lieutenant Colonel John K. Waters. The raid was a failure, and only 35 men made it back; the rest were either killed or captured, and all 57 vehicles were lost. Another prisoner liberated from the Oflag was Lt. Donald Prell who was recaptured and was sent to a POW camp south of Nuremberg. Patton reported this attempt to liberate Oflag XIII-B as the only mistake he made during World War II. When Eisenhower learned of the secret mission, he was furious. Patton later said he felt the correct decision would have been to send a Combat Command, a force about three times larger.
By April, resistance against the Third Army was tapering off, and the forces' main efforts turned to managing some 400,000 German prisoners of war. On April 14, 1945 Patton was promoted to general, a promotion long advocated by Stimson in recognition of Patton's battle accomplishments during 1944. Later that month, Patton, Bradley and Eisenhower toured the Merkers salt mine as well as the Ohrdruf concentration camp, and seeing the conditions of the camp firsthand caused Patton great disgust. Third Army was ordered toward Bavaria and Czechoslovakia, anticipating a last stand by Nazi German forces there. He was reportedly appalled to learn the Red Army would take Berlin, feeling the Soviet Union was a threat to the U.S. Patton's army advanced to Pilsen, but was stopped by Eisenhower from reaching Prague before V-E Day on May 8 and the end of the war in Europe.
In its advance from the Rhine to the Elbe, Patton's Third Army, which numbered between 250,000 and 300,000 men at any given time, captured of German territory. Its losses were 2,102 killed, 7,954 wounded, and 1,591 missing. German losses in the fighting against the Third Army totaled 20,100 killed, 47,700 wounded, and 653,140 captured.
Between becoming operational in Normandy on August 1, 1944 and the end of hostilities on May 9, 1945, the Third Army was in continuous combat for 281 days. In that time, it crossed 24 major rivers and captured of territory, including more than 12,000 cities and towns. The Third Army claimed to have killed, wounded, or captured 1,811,388 German soldiers, six times its strength in personnel. Fuller's review of Third Army records differs only in the number of enemy killed and wounded, stating that between August 1, 1944 and May 9, 1945, 47,500 of the enemy were killed, 115,700 wounded, and 1,280,688 captured, for a total of 1,443,888.
Post-war
After World War II, Patton expressed anti-Semitism and treated Jews badly in the former concentration camps – called displaced persons camps after the war – which he ran for the United States. According to The New York Times, Patton wrote into his journal that people believe "the Displaced Person is a human being, which he is not, and this applies particularly to the Jews who are lower than animals. ..."
Patton asked for a command in the Pacific Theater of Operations, begging Marshall to bring him to that war in any way possible, and Marshall said he would be able to do so only if the Chinese secured a major port for his entry, an unlikely scenario. In mid-May, Patton flew to Paris, then London for rest. On June 7, he arrived in Bedford, Massachusetts, for extended leave with his family, and was greeted by thousands of spectators. Patton then drove to Hatch Memorial Shell and spoke to some 20,000, including a crowd of 400 wounded Third Army veterans. In this speech he aroused some controversy among the Gold Star Mothers when he stated that a man who dies in battle is "frequently a fool", adding that the wounded are heroes. Patton spent time in Boston before visiting and speaking in Denver and visiting Los Angeles, where he spoke to a crowd of 100,000 at the Memorial Coliseum. Patton made a final stop in Washington before returning to Europe in July to serve in the occupation forces.
Patton was appointed military governor of Bavaria, where he led the Third Army in denazification efforts. Patton was particularly upset when learning of the end of the war against Japan, writing in his diary, "Yet another war has come to an end, and with it my usefulness to the world." Unhappy with his position and depressed by his belief that he would never fight in another war, Patton's behavior and statements became increasingly erratic. Various explanations beyond his disappointments have been proposed for Patton's behavior at this point. Carlo D'Este wrote that "it seems virtually inevitable ... that Patton experienced some type of brain damage from too many head injuries" from a lifetime of numerous auto- and horse-related accidents, especially one suffered while playing polo in 1936.
Patton's niece Jean Gordon appeared again; they spent some time together in London in 1944, and again in Bavaria in 1945. Gordon actually loved a young married captain who left her despondent when he went home to his wife in September 1945. Patton repeatedly boasted of his sexual success with this young woman but his biographers are skeptical. Hirshson says the relationship was casual. Showalter believes that Patton, under severe physical and psychological stress, made up claims of sexual conquest to prove his virility. D'Este agrees, saying, "His behavior suggests that in both 1936 [in Hawaii] and 1944–45, the presence of the young and attractive Jean was a means of assuaging the anxieties of a middle-aged man troubled over his virility and a fear of aging."
Patton attracted controversy as military governor when it was noted that several former Nazi Party members continued to hold political posts in the region. When responding to the press about the subject, Patton repeatedly compared Nazis to Democrats and Republicans in noting that most of the people with experience in infrastructure management had been compelled to join the party in the war, causing negative press stateside and angering Eisenhower. On September 28, 1945, after a heated exchange with Eisenhower over his statements, Patton was relieved of his military governorship. He was relieved of command of the Third Army on October 7, and in a somber change of command ceremony, Patton concluded his farewell remarks, "All good things must come to an end. The best thing that has ever happened to me thus far is the honor and privilege of having commanded the Third Army."
Patton's final assignment was to command the Fifteenth United States Army, based in Bad Nauheim. The Fifteenth Army at this point consisted only of a small headquarters staff tasked to compile a history of the war in Europe. Patton had accepted the post because of his love of history, but quickly lost interest in the duty. He began traveling, visiting Paris, Rennes, Chartres, Brussels, Metz, Reims, Luxembourg, and Verdun, as well as Stockholm, where he reunited with other athletes from the 1912 Olympics. Patton decided he would leave his post at the Fifteenth Army and not return to Europe once he left on December 10 for Christmas leave. He intended to discuss with his wife whether he would continue in a stateside post or retire.
Accident and death
On December 8, 1945, Patton's chief of staff, Major General Hobart Gay, invited him on a pheasant hunting trip near Speyer to lift his spirits. At 11:45 on December 9, Patton and Gay were riding in Patton's 1938 Cadillac Model 75 staff car driven by Private First Class Horace L. Woodring when they stopped at a railroad intersection in Mannheim-Käfertal to allow a train to pass. Patton, observing derelict cars along the side of the road, spoke as the car crossed the railroad track, "How awful war is. Think of the waste." Woodring glanced away from the road when a 2½ ton GMC truck driven by Technical Sergeant Robert L. Thompson, who was en route to a quartermaster depot, suddenly made a left turn in front of the car. Woodring slammed on the brakes and turned sharply to the left, colliding with the truck at a low speed.
Woodring, Thompson and Gay were only slightly injured in the crash, but Patton had not been able to brace in time and hit his head on the glass partition in the back seat of the car. He began bleeding from a gash to the head and complained to Gay and Woodring that he was paralyzed and was having trouble breathing. Taken to a hospital in Heidelberg, Patton was discovered to have a compression fracture and dislocation of the cervical third and fourth vertebrae, resulting in a broken neck and cervical spinal cord injury that rendered him paralyzed from the neck down. He spent most of the next 12 days in spinal traction to decrease spinal pressure. All non-medical visitors, except for Patton's wife, who had flown from the U.S., were forbidden. Patton, who had been told he had no chance to ever again ride a horse or resume normal life, at one point commented, "This is a hell of a way to die." He died in his sleep of pulmonary edema and congestive heart failure at about 18:00 on December 21, 1945. Patton was buried at the Luxembourg American Cemetery and Memorial in the Hamm district of Luxembourg City, alongside wartime casualties of the Third Army, per his request to "be buried with [his] men."
Legacy
Service summary of George S. Patton
Patton's colorful personality, hard-driving leadership style and success as a commander, combined with his frequent political missteps, produced a mixed and often contradictory image. Patton's great oratory skill is seen as integral to his ability to inspire troops under his command. Historian Terry Brighton concluded that Patton was "arrogant, publicity-seeking and personally flawed, but ... among the greatest generals of the war." Still, Patton's impact on armored warfare and leadership were substantial, with the U.S. Army adopting many of Patton's aggressive strategies for its training programs following his death. Many military officers claim inspiration from his legacy. The first American tank designed after the war became the M46 Patton.
Several actors have portrayed Patton on screen, the most famous being George C. Scott in the 1970 film Patton. Scott's iconic depiction of Patton, particularly of his famous speech to the Third Army, earned him an Academy Award, and was instrumental in bringing Patton into popular culture as a folk hero. He would reprise the role in 1986 in the made-for-television film The Last Days of Patton. Other actors who have portrayed Patton include Stephen McNally in the 1957 episode "The Patton Prayer" of the ABC religion anthology series, Crossroads, John Larch in the 1963 film Miracle of the White Stallions, Kirk Douglas in the 1966 film Is Paris Burning?, George Kennedy in the 1978 film Brass Target, Darren McGavin in the 1979 miniseries Ike, Robert Prentiss in the 1988 film Pancho Barnes, Mitchell Ryan in the 1989 film Double Exposure: The Story of Margaret Bourke-White, Lawrence Dobkin in a 1989 episode of the miniseries War and Remembrance, Edward Asner in the 1997 film The Long Way Home, Gerald McRaney in the 2004 miniseries Ike: Countdown to D-Day, Dan Higgins in a 2006 episode of the miniseries Man, Moment, Machine, and Kelsey Grammer in the 2008 film An American Carol.
Image
George S. Patton's speech to the Third Army
Patton deliberately cultivated a flashy, distinctive image in the belief that this would inspire his troops. He carried an ivory-gripped, engraved, silver-plated Colt Single Action Army .45 revolver on his right hip, and frequently wore an ivory-gripped Smith & Wesson Model 27 .357 Magnum on his left hip. He was usually seen wearing a highly polished helmet, riding pants, and high cavalry boots. Likewise, Patton cultivated a stern expression he called his "war face." He was known to oversee training maneuvers from atop a tank painted red, white and blue. His jeep bore oversized rank placards on the front and back, as well as a klaxon horn which would loudly announce his approach from afar. He proposed a new uniform for the emerging Tank Corps, featuring polished buttons, a gold helmet, and thick, dark padded suits; the proposal was derided in the media as "the Green Hornet," and was rejected by the Army.
Historian Alan Axelrod wrote that "for Patton, leadership was never simply about making plans and giving orders, it was about transforming oneself into a symbol." Patton intentionally expressed a conspicuous desire for glory, atypical of the officer corps of the day which emphasized blending in with troops on the battlefield. He was an admirer of Admiral Horatio Nelson for his actions in leading the Battle of Trafalgar in a full dress uniform. Patton had a preoccupation with bravery, wearing his rank insignia conspicuously in combat, and at one point during World War I rode atop a tank into a German-controlled village seeking to inspire courage in his men.
Patton was a staunch fatalist, and believed in reincarnation. He believed that he may have been a military leader killed in action in Napoleon's army in a previous life, or a Roman legionary.
Patton developed an ability to deliver charismatic speeches, in part because he had trouble with reading. He used profanity heavily in his speech, which generally was enjoyed by troops under his command but offended other generals, including Bradley. The most famous of his speeches were a series he delivered to the Third Army prior to Operation Overlord. When speaking, he was known for his bluntness and witticism; he once said, "The two most dangerous weapons the Germans have are our own armored halftrack and jeep. The halftrack because the boys in it go all heroic, thinking they are in a tank. The jeep because we have so many God-awful drivers." During the Battle of the Bulge, he famously remarked that the Allies should "let the sons-of-bitches [Germans] go all the way to Paris, then we'll cut them off and round them up." He also suggested facetiously that his Third Army could "drive the British back into the sea for another Dunkirk."
As media scrutiny on Patton increased, his bluntness stirred controversy. These began in North Africa when some reporters worried that he was becoming too close to former Vichy officials with Axis sympathies. His public image was more seriously damaged after word of the slapping incidents broke. Another controversy occurred prior to Operation Overlord when Patton spoke at a British welcoming club at Knutsford England and said, in part, "since it is the evident destiny of the British and Americans, and of course, the Russians, to rule the world, the better we know each other, the better job we will do." The next day news accounts misquoted Patton by leaving off the Russians. On a visit home after the war he again made headlines when he attempted to honor several wounded veterans in a speech by calling them "the real heroes" of the war, unintentionally offending the families of soldiers who had been killed in action. His final media blowup occurred in September 1945, when goaded by reporters about Denazification, he said "Denazification would be like removing all the Republicans and all the Democrats who were in office, who had held office or were quasi Democrats or Republicans and that would take some time." This caused Eisenhower to relieve Patton from command of the Third Army.
As a leader, Patton was known to be highly critical, correcting subordinates mercilessly for the slightest infractions, but also being quick to praise their accomplishments. While he garnered a reputation as a general who was both impatient and impulsive and had little tolerance for officers who had failed to succeed, he fired only one general during World War II, Orlando Ward, and only after two warnings, whereas Bradley sacked numerous generals during the war. Patton reportedly had the utmost respect for the men serving in his command, particularly the wounded Many of his directives showed special trouble to care for the enlisted men under his command, and he was well known for arranging extra supplies for battlefield soldiers, including blankets and extra socks, galoshes, and other items normally in short supply at the front.
Patton views on race were complicated and often negative. This may have been cultivated from his privileged upbringing and family roots in the southern United States. Privately he wrote of black soldiers: "Individually they were good soldiers, but I expressed my belief at the time, and have never found the necessity of changing it, that a colored soldier cannot think fast enough to fight in armor." However, he also stated that performance was more important than race or religious affiliation: "I don't give a damn who the man is. He can be a nigger or a Jew, but if he has the stuff and does his duty, he can have anything I've got. By God! I love him." Addressing 761st Tank Battalion Patton also said, "Men, you are the first Negro tankers ever to fight in the American Army. I would never have asked for you if you weren't good. I have nothing but the best in my army. I don't care what color you are, so long as you go up there and kill those Kraut sonsabitches! Everyone has their eyes on you and is expecting great things from you. Most of all, your race is looking forward to you. Don't let them down and, damn you, don't let me down!" Likewise, Patton called heavily on the black troops under his command. Historian Hugh Cole notes that Patton was the first to integrate black and white soldiers into rifle companies.
After reading the Koran and observing North Africans, he wrote to his wife, "Just finished reading the Koran – a good book and interesting." Patton had a keen eye for native customs and methods and wrote knowingly of local architecture; he once rated the progress of word-of-mouth rumor in Arab country at a day. In spite of his regard for the Koran, he concluded, "To me it seems certain that the fatalistic teachings of Mohammad and the utter degradation of women is the outstanding cause for the arrested development of the Arab ... Here, I think, is a text for some eloquent sermon on the virtues of Christianity." Patton was impressed with the Soviet Union but was disdainful of Russians as "drunks" with "no regard for human life." Later in life he also began to express growing feelings of antisemitism and anticommunism, as a result of his frequent controversies in the press.
As viewed by Allied and Axis leaders
On February 1, 1945, Eisenhower wrote a memo ranking the military capabilities of his subordinate American generals in Europe. Bradley and Army Air Force General Carl Spaatz shared the number one position, while Walter Bedell Smith was ranked number two, and Patton number three. Eisenhower revealed his reasoning in a 1946 review of the book Patton and his Third Army: "George Patton was the most brilliant commander of an army in the open field that our or any other service produced. But his army was part of a whole organization and his operations part of a great campaign." Eisenhower believed that other generals such as Bradley should be given the credit for planning the successful Allied campaigns across Europe in which Patton was merely "a brilliant executor".
Notwithstanding Eisenhower's estimation of Patton's abilities as a strategic planner, his overall view of Patton's military value in achieving Allied victory in Europe can best be seen in Eisenhower's refusal to even consider sending Patton home after the slapping incidents of 1943, after which he privately remarked, "Patton is indispensable to the war effort – one of the guarantors of our victory." As Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy told Eisenhower: "Lincoln's remark after they got after Grant comes to mind when I think of Patton – 'I can't spare this man, he fights'." After Patton's death, Eisenhower would write his own tribute: "He was one of those men born to be a soldier, an ideal combat leader ... It is no exaggeration to say that Patton's name struck terror at the hearts of the enemy."
Carlo D'Este insisted that Bradley disliked Patton both personally and professionally, but Bradley biographer Jim DeFelice noted that the evidence indicates otherwise. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appeared to greatly esteem Patton and his abilities, stating "he is our greatest fighting general, and sheer joy." On the other hand, Roosevelt's successor, Harry S. Truman, appears to have taken an instant dislike to Patton, at one point comparing both him and Douglas MacArthur to George Armstrong Custer.
For the most part, British commanders did not hold Patton in high regard. Field Marshal Alan Brooke noted in January 1943 that "I had heard of him, but I must confess that his swashbuckling personality exceeded my expectation. I did not form any high opinion of him, nor had I any reason to alter this view at any later date. A dashing, courageous, wild and unbalanced leader, good for operations requiring thrust and push but at a loss in any operation requiring skill and judgment." One possible exception was Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery. Although the latter's rivalry with Patton was well known, Montgomery appears to have admired Patton's ability to command troops in the field, if not his strategic judgment. Other Allied commanders were more impressed, the Free French in particular. General Henri Giraud was incredulous when he heard of Patton's dismissal by Eisenhower in late 1945, and invited him to Paris to be decorated by President Charles de Gaulle at a state banquet. At the banquet, President de Gaulle gave a speech placing Patton's achievements alongside those of Napoleon. Soviet leader Joseph Stalin was apparently an admirer, stating that the Red Army could neither have planned nor executed Patton's rapid armored advance across France.
While Allied leaders expressed mixed feelings on Patton's capabilities, the German High Command was noted to have more respect for him than for any other Allied commander after 1943. Adolf Hitler reportedly called him "that crazy cowboy general." Many German field commanders were generous in their praise of Patton's leadership following the war, Among the opinions of Patton's abilities, Oberstleutnant Horst Freiherr von Wangenheim, operations officer of the 277th Volksgrenadier Division, stated that "General Patton is the most feared general on all fronts. [His] tactics are daring and unpredictable ... He is the most modern general and the best commander of [combined] armored and infantry forces." General der Panzertruppen Hasso von Manteuffel, who had fought both Soviet and Anglo-American tank commanders, agreed: "Patton! No doubt about this. He was a brilliant Panzer army commander." and many of its highest commanders also held his abilities in high regard.
Erwin Rommel credited Patton with executing "the most astonishing achievement in mobile warfare." Generaloberst Alfred Jodl, chief of staff of the German Army, stated that Patton "was the American Guderian. He was very bold and preferred large movements. He took big risks and won big successes." Generalfeldmarschall Albert Kesselring noted that "Patton had developed tank warfare into an art, and understood how to handle tanks brilliantly in the field. I feel compelled, therefore, to compare him with Generalfeldmarschall Rommel, who likewise had mastered the art of tank warfare. Both of them had a kind of second sight in regard to this type of warfare." Referring to the escape of the Afrika Korps after the Battle of El Alamein, Fritz Bayerlein opined that "I do not think that General Patton would let us get away so easily." In an interview conducted for Stars and Stripes'' just after his capture, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt stated simply of Patton, "He is your best."
See also
General George Patton Museum of Leadership
Notes Footnotes Citations References
The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 1943–1944 (The Liberation Trilogy)
Patton, Montgomery, Rommel: Masters of War
Great feuds in history : ten of the liveliest disputes ever
Last shots for Patton's Third Army
Air Power at the Battlefront: Allied Close Air Support in Europe 1943–45
Tank tactics: from Normandy to Lorraine
Patton's Pawns: The 94th US Infantry Division at the Siegfried Line
Lovelace, Alexander G. "The Image of a General: The Wartime Relationship between General George S. Patton Jr. and the American Media." Journalism History 40 no. 2 (Summer 2014) 108–120
Great Battles through the Ages: Battle of the Bulge
Patton at Bay: The Lorraine Campaign, September to December 1944
Patton And Rommel: Men of War in the Twentieth Century Berkley Books
Military Reengineering Between the World Wars
Panzer Battles: A Study of the Employment of Armor in the Second World War
Armored Thunderbolt: The U.S. Army Sherman in World War II
George S. Patton: Leadership, Strategy, Conflict https://books.google.com/?id=oMRBgBbkHL0C&printsec=frontcover&dq=Zaloga,+Steven+%282010%29,+George+S.+Patton:+Leadership,+Strategy,+Conflict,#v=onepage&q&f=false
External links
Cadet Patton at VMI Virginia Military Institute Archives
General George Patton Museum
http://www.pattonuncovered.com/index.htm
Lost Victory – Strasbourg, November 1944
National Museum of Military History
, United States Army, from The Big Picture, narrated by Ronald Reagan
Booknotes interview with Carlo D'Este on Patton: A Genius for War, January 28, 1996.
Sir Thomas BeechamWalter F. GeorgeMatthew Ridgway
Cover of Time Magazine
April 12, 1943July 26, 1943April 9, 1945
Manuel Ávila CamachoIngrid BergmanSimon Bolivar Buckner Jr.
Commanding General of the Third United States Army
Commanding General of the Seventh United States Army July 10, 1943 – January 1, 1944 |
Source: C
ombined Arms Research Library
Command & General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, KansasÝ CGSC Home CARL Home Library Information Resources Internet Gateway Library Catalog The
Lorraine Campaign: An Overview, September-December 1944 originated at the
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College as an introductory lesson to
a course on corps operations. It is an adaptation of a narrated slide presentation
used to provide students with a historical context on which to base their
studies of current doctrine. The Lorraine Campaign, which included failures
as well as successes, was chosen because it encompassed a variety of operations
that involved such factors as logistics, intelligence, and weather.
This overview serves as a point of departure for more in-depth studies, sets
the stage for the analysis of unit operations from platoon to corps, and
furnishes a useful reference for studying branch operations in battle. Repeated
reference to this overview will give students an insight into specific operations
or single branch actions.
This study also provides a concise summary of Third Army operations in one
of the World War II European campaigns. Officers beginning their studies
of American military history will find that The Lorraine Campaign overview
contains important lessons for soldiers in today's Army.
LOUIS D. F. FRASCH
Colonel, Infantry
Director, Combat Studies Institute
CSI
publications cover a variety of military history topics. The views expressed
in a CSI publication and not necessarily those of the Department of the Army
or the Department of Defense.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Gabel, Christopher R. (Christopher Richard), 1954- The lorraine campaign.
Bibliography: p.
1. World War, 1939-1945 - Campaigns - France - Lorraine.
2. Lorraine (France) - History. I. Title.
D762.L63G3 1987 940.54'21 87-690
Maps European Theater Geography of Lorraine
Route of the Red Ball Express
Third Army Positions, 1 September 1944, Lorraine
XII Corps Plan, 5 September 1944, Nancy
Capture of Nancy by XII Corps, 11-16 September 1944
German Counterattacks Against XII Corps, 19-30 September 1944, Nancy
XX Corps at Metz, 5-25 September 1944
Third Army Dispositions, 25 September 1944, Lorraine
XX Corps Operations, October 1944, Metz
XII Corps Attack, 8 November 1944, Nancy
XX Corps Capture of Metz, 8-21 November 1944
Third Army Operations, 19 November 1944
Third Army Redeployment, 20-26 December 1944
Third Army Operations in Lorraine
Third Army Gains, September - December 1944, Lorraine
Figures
German Volksgrenadier Division, 1944
German Panzer Division, 1944
German Panzer Grenadier Division, 1944
Third Army in the Lorraine Campaign
U.S. Corps, 1944
U.S. Infantry Division with Attachments and Typical Task Organization
U.S. Armored Division with Attachments and Typical Task Organization
LORRAINE OVERVIEW
On 6 June 1944, Allied troops landed in Normandy, and
the liberation of German-occupied France was underway.
Throughout June and July, Allied soldiers expanded their
beachhead against stiff resistance while building up
strength for the breakout. On 25 July, American forces
under the command of LTG Omar Bradley ruptured the German
defenses on the western end of the beachhead and broke
into the clear. The U.S. Third Army, under the command of
LTG George S. Patton, Jr., became operational on 1 August
and poured through the gap.
Thus began one of the most sensational campaigns in
the annals of American military history. Patton's Third
Army raced through a narrow corridor between the German
Seventh Army and the sea, turned the flank of the entire
German line in Normandy, and tore into the German rear.
Third Army advanced in all four directions at once, with
elements advancing south to the Loire River, west into the
Brittany peninsula, north to a junction with the British
near Falaise, and east towards the Seine River and Paris.
(See Map 1.)
The German forces in Normandy collapsed and, barely
escaping total encirclement, streamed back toward Germany
with crippling losses in men and equipment. Patton's army
pursued ruthlessly and recklessly deep into France.
Armored spearheads led the way, with infantry riding the
backs of the tanks. Overhead, fighter-bombers patrolled
the flanks, reported, on conditions toward the front, and
attacked any German unit that took to the roads in
daylight. Allied forces invaded southern France on
15 August and joined in the pursuit. With the remnants of
two German army groups in full retreat, the Supreme Allied
Commander, GEN Dwight D. Eisenhower, noted in his diary on
5 September, "The defeat of the German Army is complete."
As Third Army neared the French border province of
Lorraine, Third Army's intelligence sources seemed to
confirm that the war was virtually over. The top-secret
interceptions known as Ultra revealed that the
Franco-German border was virtually undefended and would
remain so until mid-September. A corps reconnaissance
squadron reported that the Moselle River, the, last major
water barrier in France, was also undefended. Patton
issued orders to his corps to seize Metz and Nancy, sweep
through Lorraine, and cross the Rhine River at Mannheim
and Mainz.
Map 1. European Theater
Soldiers and generals alike assumed that Lorraine
would fall quickly, and unless the war the war ended first,
Patton's tanks would take into Germany by summer's
end. But Lorraine was not to be overrun in a lightning
campaign. Instead, the battle for Lorraine would drag on
for more than 3 months. Why did the rosy predictions of
August go unfulfilled? And how did it come to pass that
Lorraine would be the scene of Third Army's bloodiest
campaign?
The province of Lorraine is the most direct route
between France and Germany. Bounded on the west by the
Moselle River, on the east by the Saar River, with
Luxembourg and the Ardennes to the north, and the Vosges
Mountains to the south, Lorraine has been a traditional
invasion route between east and west for centuries. The
province has changed hands many times. Considered a part
of France since 1766, Lorraine fell under German
possession between 1870 and 1914, and again in the period
1940-44, when Hitler proclaimed it apart of Germany
proper.
Despite its proximity to Germany, Lorraine was not the
Allies' preferred invasion route in 1944. Except for its
two principal cities, Metz and Nancy, the province
contained few significant military objectives. After the
campaign a frustrated General Patton sent the following
message to the War Department:
I hope that in the final settlement of the war,
you insist that the Germans retain Lorraine,
because I can imagine no greater burden than to
be the owner of this nasty country where it rains
every day and where the whole wealth of the
people consists in assorted manure piles.
Moreover, once Third Army penetrated the province and
entered Germany, there would still be no first-rate
military objectives within its grasp. The Saar industrial
region, while significant, was of secondary importance
when compared to the great Ruhr industrial complex farther
north. The ancient trading cities of the upper Rhine that
had tempted conquerors for centuries were no longer of
primary rank in modern, industrialized Germany. Viewed in
this light, it is understandable that the basic plan for
the European campaign called for the main effort to be
made farther north, in the 21st Army Group's zone, where
the vital military and industrial objectives lay. (See
Map 2.)
Not only did Lorraine hold out few enticements, but it
would prove to be a difficult battlefield as well. The
rolling farmland was broken by tangled woods and numerous
towns and villages, some of which were fortified. Because
the ground rises gently from west to east, the Americans
would frequently find themselves attacking uphill. Third
Army would have to cross numerous rivers and streams that
ran generally south to north and would have to penetrate
two fortified lines to reach Germany--the French-built
Maginot Line and the so-called Siegfried Line, or
Westwall, which stood just inside of Germany itself. The
Americans would not even be able to count on the
unqualified support of Lorraine's inhabitants, for the
Germans had deliberately colonized the province during
their periods of control.
With so little going for it, why did Patton bother
with Lorraine at all? The reason was that Eisenhower, the
Supreme Allied Commander, made up his mind to destroy as
many German forces as possible west of the Rhine.
Map 2. Geography of Lorraine
Omar Bradley, Patton's immediate superior as commander of
12th Army Group, concurred. All Allied armies were
ordered to press ahead on a broad front. In late August
1944, with the Lorraine gateway so invitingly open, it was
unthinkable to Patton that Third Army should be halted in
midstride.
Unfortunately, one final fact of geography was to
disappoint Patton's hopes for the rapid dash into
Germany. Lorraine lies some 500 miles from the Normandy
beaches over which Third Army still drew much of its
supply. During the August pursuit across France, Third
Army consumed 350,000 gallons of gasoline every day. To
fulfill this requirement and to meet similar demands from
First Army, Communications Zone organized the famous,
Red Ball Express, a nonstop conveyor belt of trucks
connecting the Normandy depots with the field armies.
Map 3. Route of the Red Ball Express
At its peak, Red Ball employed 6,000 trucks that ran
day and night in an operation that became more difficult
with every mile the armies advanced. To meet the demands
of logistics, three newly arrived infantry divisions were
completely stripped of their trucks and left immobile in
Normandy. The use of the Red Ball Express represented a
calculated gamble that the war would end before the trucks
broke down, for the vehicles were grossly overloaded and
preventive maintenance was all but ignored. The Red Ball
Express itself consumed 300,000 gallons of precious
gasoline every day--nearly as much as a field army. (See
Map 3.)
Thus, it was not surprising that on 28 August, with
Patton's spearheads in the vicinity of Reims, Third Army's
gasoline allocation fell 100,000 gallons short of
requirements; and since all reserves had been burned up in
the course of the pursuit, the pace of Patton's advance
began to suffer almost at once. The simple truth was that
although gasoline was plentiful in Normandy, there was no
way to transport it in sufficient quantities to the
leading elements. On 31 August, Third Army received no
gasoline at all. With fuel tanks running dry, Patton's
spearheads captured Verdun and crossed the Meuse River.
For the next 5 days, Third Army was virtually
immobilized. Eisenhower granted logistical priority to
the British and American armies farther north, leaving
Third Army with about one-quarter of its required daily
gasoline allotments. Patton's troops captured some
gasoline from the Germans, hijacked some from First Army
depots, and received some gasoline by air, but when
gasoline receipts finally increased to the point that the
advance could be resumed, the opportunity of sweeping
through Lorraine unopposed had passed. (See Map 4.)
Map Map 4. Third Army Positions, 1 September 1944, Lorraine
The gasoline shortage was followed by a shortage of
ammunition, particularly in the larger artillery calibers
that had not been in great demand during the fluid
pursuit. When operations became more static along the
Lorraine border, there was no way to build up ammunition
stocks because all available trucks were carrying
gasoline. By 10 September, Third Army's artillery
batteries received only one-third of a unit of fire per
day. Other shortages would crop up as the campaign
progressed. At one time or another, rations, clothing,
mattress covers, coffee, tires, tobacco, antifreeze,
winter clothing, and overshoes would all be in critically
short supply.
Third Army's intelligence sources began to run dry at
the same time as its gas tanks. Ultra intercepts had
proved invaluable during the pursuit when fleeing German
units relied heavily on the radio for communication.
Ultra would continue to produce intelligence of
significant strategic value, but as Third Army approached
Lorraine, Ultra provided less and less information of an
operational and tactical nature. Free French sources had
cooperated actively with Third during the pursuit,
but Lorraine, with its partially hostile population and
its swelling German garrison, was not a favorable setting
for Resistance activities. Military intelligence interpreter
teams found fewer knowledgeable natives willing to
be interviewed, and the barrier posed by the Moselle River
prevented the easy flow of both civilian agents and combat
patrols. Moreover, the corps commanders did not receive
Ultra at all. Their corps intelligence assets could, at
best, see only 15,000 yards behind the enemy's front.
Significantly, the American gasoline crisis and lapse
in intelligence coincided with a major German buildup in
Lorraine. When Patton's tanks sputtered to a halt, the
German forces defending Lorraine totaled only 9 infantry
battalions, 2 artillery batteries, and 10 tanks. During
the first week in September, while Third Army was
immobilized, German forces flowed into Lorraine from the
northern sector of the front, from southern France, and
from Italy. The headquarters charged with the defense of
Lorraine was Army Group G, under the command of
GEN Johannes Blaskowitz. First Army, Nineteenth Army, and
later Fifth Panzer Army were Blaskowitz's major forces,
although all were badly depleted. Responsibility for the
entire Western Front devolved upon Field Marshal
Gerd von Rundstedt, who had held that post during the
Normandy campaign until he told Hitler's headquarters,
"Make peace, you fools!" Hitler restored von Rundstedt to
command on 1 September and ordered the field marshal to
keep Patton out of Lorraine until the defenses along the
German frontier could be built up. Von Rundstedt also
began amassing forces for a counterattack in the Ardennes
that would eventually take place in December.
Few of the Germans defending Lorraine could be
considered first-rate troops. Third Army encountered
whole battalions made up of deaf men, others of cooks, and
still others consisting entirely of soldiers with stomach
ulcers. The G2 also identified a new series of German
formations designated volksgrenadier divisions. (See
Figure 1.) These hastily constituted divisions numbered
only 10,000 men each and possessed only six rifle
battalions; in theory they were to be provided with extra
artillery and assault guns to compensate for the
quantitative and qualitative inferiority of their
infantry. Two to 3 panzer divisions faced Third Army in a
mobile reserve role, but these units had managed to bring
only 5 or 10 tanks apiece out of the retreat across
France. (See Figure 2.) Instead of rebuilding the
depleted panzer divisions, Hitler preferred to devote tank
production to the creation of ad hoc formations,
designated panzer brigades, that were controlled at the
corps or army level. Other formations that Third Army
would face in Lorraine included
panzer grenadier
(mechanized infantry divisions) and elements o
Waffen SS
. (See Figure 3.)
Figure 1. German Volksgrenadier Division, 1944
Figure 2. German Panzer Division, 1944
and Figure 3. German Panzer Grenadier Division, 1944
On the eve of the autumn battles along the German
frontier, von Rundstedt's Western Front forces were
outnumbered 2 to 1 in effective manpower, 25 to 1 in
artillery tubes, and 20 to 1 in tanks. But despite its
tattered appearance, the army that rose up to protect the
borders of the Fatherland was not a beaten force. When
Patton's troops received enough gasoline to resume their
advance towards the Moselle on 5 September, after a delay
of nearly a week, the troops quickly discovered that the
great pursuit was over. Instead of running down the
fleeing fragments of shattered German units, soldiers all
along Third Army's front encountered enemy soldiers who
contested every foot of ground and who counterattacked
viciously to recover lost positions. Third Army
intelligence clearly indicated that the Germans were no
longer in headlong retreat, yet some time would pass
before Patton and his corps commanders accepted the fact
that the pursuit had ended.
Figure 4. Third Army in the Lorraine Campaign
At the same time that Army Group G received
reinforcements, Patton's Third Army was being trimmed
down. In the pursuit across France, Third Army had
controlled four far-flung corps, but during September two
of those corps were detached from Patton's command. For
most of the Lorraine campaign, Third Army would consist of
two corps, the XX and the XII. Four to six infantry
divisions and two or three armored divisions would carry
the bulk of the burden for the next 3 months. In addition
to these major combat elements, Third Army controlled 2
quartermaster groups totaling 60 companies, 2 ordnance
groups comprising 11 battalions, and 6 groups of
engineers. An antiaircraft artillery brigade and a tank
destroyer brigade provided administrative support to their
respective battalions, most of which were attached to
lower echelons. (See Figure 4.)
Each of Third Army's two corps possessed as organic
troops a headquarters with support elements and a corps
artillery headquarters. In the Lorraine campaign, two or
three infantry and one or two armored divisions were
usually attached to each corps. One or two cavalry groups
of two squadrons each provided corps reconnaissance. (See
Figure 5.)
Figure 5. U.S. Corps, 1944
Corps artillery consisted of four to five field
artillery groups controlled by a corps fire direction
center (FDC), which could allocate its assets to the
divisions or control them itself. Corps artillery also
tied into the divisional artillery, making it possible to
coordinate every field artillery tube within that corps.
In the Lorraine campaign, the corps zones became so wide
that one FDC could not control all of the corps
artillery. A field artillery brigade headquarters
frequently served as a second FDC, splitting the corps
zone with the corps artillery FDC.
The corps FDC system was highly efficient at massing
artillery fires and proved to be extremely responsive and
flexible. On one occasion during the Lorraine campaign,
an infantry unit about to make an assault contacted XX
Corps FDC with a request for artillery support. The FDC
plotted the target and issued orders to the appropriate
artillery battalion. The battalion in turn assigned the
mission to a battery which delivered 67 rounds on the
target. The total elapsed time from receipt of request to
completion of the mission was 6 minutes. At the other
extreme, XII Corps artillery, aided by the 33d Field
Artillary Brigade, organized a program of fires in support
of the November offensive that involved 380 concentrations
over a 4-bour period.
The American infantry division in World II was the
15,000-man triangular division, so callled because it
possessed three infantry regiments, each of which
consisted of three battalions, and so on. Four battalions
made up the divisional artillery, whose primary weapons
were the 105-mm and 155-mm howitzers. Typically, the
triangular division, which was originally also designed to be a
"light division," also included plug-in components such as
quartermaster trucks, extra artillery, and extra
engineers. For example, although the division could
motorize only one regiment with organic truck assets, by
attaching six quartermaster truck companies, it could be
made 100 percent vehicle-mobile. Most infantry divisions
controlled a tank battalion and a tank destroyer battalion
which was usually equipped tank-like vehicles. The
division was capable of breaking down into regimental
combat teams, each with its own complement of artillery,
engineers, armor, and tank destroyers. Regimental combat
teams, however, were not provided with support elements.
The infantry division bad to fight as a division. (See
Figure 6.)
Figure 6. U.S. Infantry Division with Attachment and Typical Task Organization
Figure 7. U.S. Armored Division with Attachments and Typical Task Organization
The 1944 armored division was a relatively small
organization of 11,000 men and 263 tanks. It possessed
three tank battalions, three battalions of armored
infantry, and three battalions of self-propelled
artillery. Three task force headquarters, designated
Combat Commands A, B, and R, controlled any mix of
fighting elements in battle. According to doctrine, the
armored division was primarily a weapon of exploitation to
be committed after the infantry division had created a
penetration. The M-4 Sherman tank reflected this
doctrine. It was mobile, reliable, and mounted a general
purpose 75-mm gun in most of its variants. In keeping
with doctrine, tank destroyers and not tanks carried the
high-velocity anti-tank guns. (See Figure 7).
The relationship among field army, corps, and division
was prescribed by LTG Lesley J. McNair, head of Army
Ground Forces in Washington. Divisions were to be lean
and simple, offensive in orientation, with attachments
made as necessary. The corps was designed to be a purely
tactical headquarters that could handle any mix of
infantry and armored divisions. The field army allocated
divisions to the corps and assigned supplemental combat
support and service support elements where needed.
Logistics flowed from Communications Zone through the
field army to the divisions, theoretically bypassing the
corps echelon. In actual practice, the corps did become
involved in logistics, at least to the extent of
designating truck heads and allocating service support
units. The typical division slice in the European theater
was 40,000 troops, of which 15,000 were organic to the
division, 15,000 were corps and army troops, and 10,000
were Communications Zone personnel.
Rounding out the weapons in Patton's arsenal for the
Lorraine campaign was the XIX Tactical Air Command (TAC),
which had cooperated with Third Army throughout the
pursuit across France. Fighter-bombers from the XIX TAC
flew 12,000 sorties in support of Third Army during
August, but in September, TACs efforts would be divided
between the Lorraine front and the battles being waged to
reduce the German fortresses still holding out along the
French coast. As the autumn wore on, XIX TAC would be
increasingly frustrated by poor weather. By this stage in
the war, however, the German air force was capable only of
sporadic operations.
Thus, at the outset of the Lorraine campaign, Third
Army was logistically starved, depleted in strength, and
denied the full use of its air assets. In spite of this,
Patton and his superiors remained convinced that the war
could be ended in 1944. On 10 September, 12th Army Group
ordered Third Army to advance on a broad front and seize
crossings over the Rhine River at Mannheim and Mainz.
Patton's forces were already on the move.
The focus of attention in September was on XII Corps,
commanded by MG Manton S. Eddy. The XII Corps was the
southern of Third Army's two permanent corps. Its
principal components were the 35th and 80th Infantry
Divisions and the 4th Armored Division. Later the
month, the 6th Armored Division would join the corps.
Eddy's immediate objective was Nancy, one of two major
cities in Lorraine. Although unfortified, Nancy was
protected by the terrain and, most important, by the
Moselle River. (See Map 5.)
Map 5. XII Corps Plan, 5 September 1944, Nancy
The XII Corps' first attempt to capture Nancy began on
5 September, the day that Third Army received just enough
gasoline to resume its advance. Eddy ordered 35th
Division to attack Nancy from the west. Simultaneously,
the 4th Armored Division, passing through a bridgehead
across the Moselle (to be secured by 80th Division), would
attack the city from the east. The plan was foiled when
80th Division failed to obtain its bridgehead. The
crossing attempt, staged at Pont-ý-Mousson, was made
straight off the march, without reconnaissance, secrecy,
or adequate artillery support. Such improvised operations
had worked during the pursuit, but when the 80th Division
pushed a battalion across the Moselle, it collided with
the 3d Panzer Grenadier
Division, just arrived from
Italy. The Germans held dominating ground and could, not
be dislodged. The American bridgehead collapsed, and the
survivors returned to the west bank.
Map 6. Capture of Nancy by XII Corps, 11-16 September 1944
Following this reverse, Eddy took 5 days to regroup
his corps and prepare a more deliberate operation. On
11 September, a regiment of 35th Division, supported by
corps artillery, established a bridgehead across the
Moselle south of Nancy and fought its way toward the
city. North of Nancy, 80th Division made a successful
crossing on the following day at Dieulouard. This time
secrecy and a careful deception plan paid off. The
Dieulouard bridgehead was established against little
opposition and pontoon bridges were quickly emplaced.
However, once the initial surprise wore off, German
reaction to the Dieulouard bridgehead was savage. Heavy
artillery fire and repeated counterattacks by 3d
Panzer Grenadier
Division threatened to erase 80th Division's
bridgehead across the Moselle. (See Map 6.)
Early on the morning of 13 September, Combat Command A
of 4th Armored Division began to cross into the threatened
bridgehead. The leading armored elements routed a German
counterattack then in progress and broke through the
German forces containing the bridgehead. Spearheaded by
37th Tank Battalion, under the command of
LTC Creighton Abrams, and reinforced by a battalion of
truck-mounted infantry from 80th Infantry Division, Combat
Command A punched into the enemy rear, overrunning German
positions with all guns firing. Operating on a front
equal to the width of the lead tank and with its supply
trains accompanying the combat elements, Combat Command A
covered 45 miles in 37 hours, overran the German
headquarters responsible for the defense of Nancy, and
established a position blocking the escape routes from the
city. Combat Command B, which had passed through the
bridgehead south. of Nancy, linked up with Combat Command A
between Arracourt and LunÈville. Nancy itself fell to the
35th Division on 15 September.
With XII Corps established on the east bank of the
Moselle, LTG Patton hoped to resume the war of movement in
which Third Army excelled. He ordered MG Eddy to attack
eastward with divisions in column. The objective of
XII Corps was still to cross the Rhine. The Germans, who
had no reserves in the area, feared that XII Corps was on
the verge of a breakthrough. But before he resumed the
eastward advance, Eddy chose to clear out pockets of
resistance around Nancy, giving the Germans 3 days to
bring reinforcements to the sector. Army Group G received
orders to drive in XII Corps' right flank and throw
Patton's forces back across the Moselle. To carry out
this mission, the Germans recreated Fifth Panzer Army, a
hastily scraped together force commanded by General
Hasso von Manteuffel, an armor expert imported from the
Russian Front. From 19 to 25 September, two panzer
brigades of the LVIII Panzer Corps hammered at Combat
Command A's exposed position around Arracourt. Although
outgunned by the German Panther tanks, the American
Shermans and self-propelled tank destroyers enjoyed
superior mobility and received overwhelming air support
when the weather permitted. The fogs which interferred
with American air strikes also neutralized the superior
range of German tank armament. At the end of the
week-long battle, Combat Command A reported 25 tanks and
7 tank destroyers lost but claimed 285 German tanks
destroyed. (See Map 7.)
Map 7. German Counterattacks Against XII Corps, 19-30 September 1944, Nancy
To the north of Fifth Panzer Army, the German First
Army attempted to eliminate XII Corps' bridgehead across
the Seille River. The 559th
Volksgrenadier Division
launched a series of attacks against 35th Division in the
GrÈmecey Forest that lasted from 26 to 30 September. In
contrast to the tank battle at Arracourt, 35th Division's
engagement at GrÈmecey was a swirling infantry battle
fought out at close quarters among thick woods and
entrenchments left over from World War I. After 3 days of
chaotic, seesaw fighting, Eddy ordered the 35th to
withdraw across the Seille, an order which Patton promptly.
The arrival of, 6th Armored Division from
Army reserve restored the situation with a double
envelopment of the hotly contested forest. However,
Eddy's status as corps commander suffered badly. His
relationship with the division commanders never fully
recovered, and Patton seriously contemplated relieving
him. (See Map 7.)
Hitler responded to the loss of Nancy and the failed
German counterattacks by relieving Blaskowitz from command
of Army Group A. To replace him, Hitler chose General
Hermann Balck, an experienced corps commander from the
Russian Front.
In the northern sector of Third Army's front,
MG Walton Walker's XX Corps also established a bridgehead
across the Moselle during September. Walker's orders were
to capture Metz and sweep to the Rhine, a task far beyond
the capabilities of a corps that held a 40-mile front with
three divisions, the 5th, 90th, and 7th Armored.
Moreover, Metz, unlike Nancy, was thoroughly fortified.
Forty-three intercommunicating forts on both sides of the
Moselle ringed the city. Although some of the older
fortifications dated from the nineteenth century, the more
modern ones could house garrisons of up to 2,000 men and
were armed with heavy artillery mounted in steel and
concrete turrets. Designed to hold an entire field army,
the Metz fortifications were manned by 14,000 troops of
the 462d Division. At this point in the campaign,
XX Corps was using Michelin road maps and thus had
virtually no knowledge of the Metz fortifications. (See
Map 8.)
Map 8. XX Corps at Metz, 5-25 September 1944
On 7 September, 5th Infantry Division opened the
assault on Metz, ignorant of the fact that it was
attacking the most strongly fortified city in Western
Europe. For a week one of its regiments was chewed to
pieces among the forts west of the Moselle, which were
manned by students of an officer candidate school. Even
when reinforced by a combat command of the 7th Armored
Division, the American attack made little progress.
Incidently, this action took place on the same ground upon
which two German, field armies were mauled in equally
unsuccessful assaults during the 1870 Franco-Prussian War.
In an attempt to encircle Metz, MG Walker also ordered
5th Division to establish a bridgehead across the Moselle
south of the city. The 5th Division's first crossing,
made at Dornot, was a makeshift frontal assault against a
prepared enemy, which included elements of the
17th SS Panzer Grenadier
Division. The crossing operation
was marked by great confusion. It lacked adequate
artillery support, and it was subjected to hostile fire
coming from both banks of the river. Four companies
established a tiny bridgehead on the east bank which was
bombarded continuously by artillery and mortars. For
2 days the bridgehead forces turned back repeated
counterattacks, while German fire disrupted ferrying
operations and prevented the building of a bridge.
Finally, the survivors in the bridgehead were withdrawn
without their equipment.
A more carefully planned crossing operation succeeded
nearby at Arnaville on 10 September. Under the covering
fire of 13 artillery battalions, plus air support and a
generated smoke screen, 5th Division established a
permanent bridgehead over the Moselle that became the main
divisional effort. The artillery of XX Corps and the
P-47s of XIX Tactical Air Command helped break up
counterattacks mounted by the 3d and the 17th
SS Panzer Grenadier
Divisions. Although the 5th Division had
successtully crossed the Moselle, the ring of
fortifications protecting Metz was still virtually
intact. The 7th Armored. Division crossed into the
Arnaville bridgehead with orders from MG Walker to hook
behind Metz while 5th Division captured the city itself.
However, the terrain was unsuited to armored operations,
and 5th Division was bled white--by the end of the month
the 5th required 5,000 fillers to bring it up to
strength. Meanwhile, a stalemate ensued along XX Corps'
front.
On 25 September, Third Army operations came to an
abrupt halt. Even with the Red Ball Express running at
full capacity, logistical support was inadequate to
sustain operations by all of the Allied forces on the
Continent. Accordingly, GEN Eisenhower decreed that the
main Allied effort would come from the British 21st Army
Group, which received transportation priority. The 12th
Army Group, including Third Army, was to bold its present
positions until the logistical crisis receded. LTG Patton
was unwilling to yield the initiative to the enemy, so he
ordered Third Army not to dig in, but rather to establish
outpost lines and maintain active, mobile reserves. (See
Map 9.)
Map 9. Third Army Disositions, 25 September 1944, Lorraine
Third Army was relatively dormant from 25 September to
8 November. Patton's forces utilized the time to
carefully husband resources and build up reserves for
future operations. Stringent gasoline rationing went into
effect on 3 October, and although gasoline receipts for
the month were only 67 percent of requested amounts, Third
Army managed to amass a small reserve. The larger
calibers of ammunition were also strictly rationed. To
take the place of silent artillery tubes, tanks, tank
destroyers, and mortars were surveyed in for use as
artillery. Extensive use was also made of captured German
ordnance. One time on target (TOT) fired in XX Corps'
zone was executed with captured German 105-mm howitzers,
Russian-made 76.2-mm guns and French 155-mm howitzers
(also captured from the ' Germans), and German 88-mm
antitank guns. Eighty percent of the artillery ammunition
expended by XX Corps in the last week of October was of
German origin.
A number of factors facilitated Third Army's
logistical recovery. One of these was the speed with
which the French railroad system was rehabilitated and put
to military use. Although the railroads in Normandy had
been thoroughly interdicted prior to and during the
invasion, those in central and eastern France were
relatively undamaged by Allied aircraft and had been
abandoned almost intact by the retreating Germans. During
the October lull, Third Army brought its railheads, as far
forward as Nancy. For a time, Third Army personnel
actually operated the trains themselves. The French
civilian sector provided rolling stock and trained
personnel to supplement Third Army's quartermasters.
The French civilian economy, by providing what we
today call "host nation support," helped ease Third Army's
logistical burdens in other ways as well. The Gnome-Rhone
engine works in Paris were retooled to repair American
tank engines. Other manufacturers produced tank escape
hatches and track extenders that greatly facilitated
mobility in the Lorraine mud. When colder weather
precipitated a critical shortage of antifreeze, French
industry supplied thousands of gallons of alcohol in lieu
of Prestone. Local sources also produced fan belts, and
when tires became so scarce that all spares were removed
from their racks and put into use, French tire
manufacturers turned their production over to the U.S.
Army. With Patton's permission, Third Army's ordnance
units moved inside existing French facilities with the
result that ordnance productivity increased 50 percent.
In fact, Third Army utilized everything from local coal
mines to dry-cleaning plants.
Captured German supplies were another important source
of materiel during the October lull. In addition to the
weapons and ammunition mentioned earlier, Third Army used
captured gasoline transported in captured jerricans, spark
plugs rethreaded for American engines, and thousands of
tons of food that fed both soldiers and local civilians.
By the time full-scale operations resumed in
November, Third Army's program of rationing and local
procurement had resulted in the establishment of
substantial reserves. On the average, each division held
4 days of Class I and 5 days of Class III supplies when
the eastward advance was resumed. Except for heavy
artillery shells, the ammunition shortage was no longer
critical.
Third Army's intelligence picture also improved during
the October lull. Through Ultra and other sources, the
German order of battle was well known to Third Army's G2
and would remain so throughout the campaign. Ultra
revealed that the Germans, too, were rationing gasoline.
Even the panzer divisions were partially dependant on
horse-drawn transportation. The XX Corps received
detailed plans of the Metz fortifications obtained from
archives in Paris and supplemented by French officers who
had built and manned the citadel. The most encouraging
intelligence received in October revealed that the Germans
were withdrawing many of their best units from Lorraine,
including Fifth Panzer Army. Intelligence did not
disclose, however, that these forces were being amassed
for the Ardennes counteroffensive which came in December.
The quality and quantity of Patton's forces improved
while the German defenders in Lorraine declined in
effectiveness. During October and the first week in
November, American units were rotated out of the line to
rest, refit, and absorb replacements. The XX Corps gave
up the 7th Armored Division but acquired the 95th Infantry
and 10th Armored Divisions in return. In addition, XII
Corps obtained the 26th Division, raising Third Army's
strength to six infantry and three armored divisions.
Although ordered by 12th Army Group to hold its
position, Third Army conducted several limited operations
during the October lull. The XII Corps closed in on the
Seille River, giving its new units some exposure to combat
and securing jump-off positions for future operations.
Meanwhile, XX Corps prepared for a systematic reduction of
Metz. An extensive and highly integrated artillery
observation system was established that tied together 70
ground observation posts and 62 airborne observers. All
XX Corps divisions rotated out of the line for training in
the reduction of fortifications. The 90th, Division
patiently cleared the Germans out of MaiziËres-lËs-Metz in
a carefully controlled operation that simultaneously
opened the only unfortified approach to Metz and provided
the division with experience in urban combat. (See
Map 10.)
On 3 October, XX Corps' battle-scarred 5th Division
mounted an ill-advised attack on Fort Driant, one of the
fortress complexes protecting Metz from the south and
west. With the support of 23 artillery battalions,
1 rifle battalion reinforced by tanks and tank destroyers
managed to occupy Driant's surface, but the American
infantrymen were unable to penetrate the underground
galleries. American artillery was disappointingly
ineffective against Driant's five batteries. An American
8-inch gun scored eight direct hits on one of Driant's
artillery turrets, silencing the German piece for 15
minutes, after which it resumed operation. Following 10
days of fighting in which 50 percent of the assaulting
infantry were killed or wounded, American forces withdrew
from Fort Driant. (See Map 10.)
On 21 October, Third Army received orders to resume full-scale offensive operations on or about 10 November.
Patton's objective was still the Rhine River. By this
time Third Army outnumbered the Germans in Lorraine by
250,000 to 86,000. However, the Germans were about to
obtain a valuable ally in the form of the weather. Seven
inches of rain fell in November, about twice the normal amount. Twenty days that month had rain. Lorraine
suffered from its worst floods in 35 years. On two
different occasions, floodwaters washed out the Moselle
bridges behind the Third Army in the midst of heavy
fighting. Almost all operations were limited to the hard
roads, a circumstance that the Germans exploited through
the maximum use of demolitions. Third Army engineers
built over 130 bridges during November.
The weather virtually negated American air
superiority. The XIX Tactical Air Command, which had
flown 12,000 sorties in the golden days of August, flew
only 3,500 in November. There was no air activity at all
for 12 days out of the month.
Map 10. XX Corps Operations, October 1944, Metz
Third Army's offensive began on 8 November in weather
so bad that MG Eddy, XII Corps commander, asked Patton to
postpone the attack. Patton told Eddy to attack as
scheduled or else name his successor. Despite the total
lack of air support, Eddy attacked on the 8th and
throughly surprised the defending Germans, who believed
that the weather was too bad to allow offensive
operations. The most massive artillery preparation in
Third Army history preceded XII Corps' attack. All of XII
Corps' artillery plus 5 battalions borrowed from XX
Corps--for a total of 42 battalions and 540 guns--poured
22,000 rounds on the stunned Germans. At 0600, XII Corps
jumped off with three infantry divisions abreast and two
armored divisions in corps reserve. Instead of waiting
for a decisive opportunity in which to commit his reserve,
Eddy broke the armored divisions up into combat commands
and sent them into the line on D plus 2, thus relegating
Third Army's most powerful concentration of armor to an
infantry-support role. With the American armor dispersed,
the defending German 11th Panzer Division was able to
restrict XII Corps' rate of advance with a relatively thin
delaying screen and local counterattacks. (See Map 11.)
Map 11. XII Corps Attack, 8 November 1944, Nancy
General Walker's XX Corps made its main attack across
the Moselle in the Metz sector on 9 November, one day
after XII Corps. It, too, achieved surprise. The 90th
Division and 10th Armored Division had shifted to assembly
areas north of Thionville in great secrecy. A detachment
of special troops maintained radio traffic and manned
dummy guns in the vacated zone. There was no artillery
preparation so as not to disclose the imminent attack.
The Moselle flooded out of its banks, which complicated
the crossing operation but had the side benefit of
inundating the German minefields on the east bank and
lulling the defenders into a false sense of security.
Finally, 95th Division staged a demonstration south of
Thionville that involved crossing a battalion to the east
bank, thus drawing attention away from the main effort
farther north. General Balck, commander of German Army
Group G, had ordered his units to hold the front with a
minimum of strength until the anticipated artillery
barrage had passed, whereupon they were to rush forward in
force to meet the American assault waves. Since there was
no artillery barrage, and since the Germans otherwise
failed to predict the attack, Balck's defensive scheme was
unhinged at the outset of the operation. (See Map 12.)
Map 12. XX Corps Capture of Metz, 8-12 November 1944
The 90th Division crossed the swirling waters of the
Moselle at Koenigsmacker early on 9 November and
established a secure bridgehead. The 10th Armored
Division moved up to the west bank, ready to cross into
the bridgehead as soon as the engineers were able to build
a bridge. Due to the high, fast waters, 5 days would pass
before armor crossed the Moselle in force. The Moselle
crossings taxed Third Army's engineers to the utmost. An
infantry support bridge put in behind 90th Division was
swept away, and the approaches were flooded. When the
waters finally subsided, bridges were established for the
90th and 95th Divisions, only to be inundated by a 10th Armored
second flood even greater than the first. The bridges
themselves were saved, but their approaches were
completely underwater tendering them useless until the
Moselle once more receded. Meanwhile, liaison aircraft
and amphibious trucks helped keep the bridgehead supplied,
and concentrated artillery fire from the west bank helped
break up the repeated German counterattacks mounted
against 90th Division until armor could cross the Moselle.
The XX Corps' artillery also saw to it that the
Germans suffered as much as possible from the atrocious
weather. The 17 artillery battalions supporting 90th
Division shelled all buildings in the assault area,
driving the defenders out into the rain and mud. The U.S.
Eighth Air Force contributed to this effort by sending
over 1,000 four-engine bombers to conduct saturation.
bombing of the towns and villages in the assault area.
The poor weather forced the airmen to bomb by radar, which
detracted significantly from the accuracy of the attack.
With 90th Division established at Koenigsmacker, 5th
Division pushing north from the Arnaville bridgehead, and
95th Division advancing across the old Franco-Prussian War
battlefield west of the city, XX Corps had three divisions
poised to close on Metz. Then, XX Corps created another
threat by converting 95th Division's demonstration at
Uckange into a major effort and reinforcing it with
armor. Given the designation Task Force Bacon, this
battle group fought its way toward Metz in mobile columns
led by tanks and tank destroyers that shot up all possible
centers of resistance, to the extent of using 3-inch
antitank guns to knock out individual snipers. All of the
forces closing on Metz employed new techniques in dealing
with fortified areas. Frontal assaults were avoided.
Instead, strongpoints and forts were surrounded, bypassed,
and systematically reduced with high explosives and
gasoline. Task Force Bacon entered Metz from the north
on 17 November, the same day 5th Division reached the city
from the south and 95th Division neared the Moselle
bridges to the west. As street fighting ensued in Metz
itself, XX Corps' artillery laid interdiction fire on all
German escape routes east of the city. (See Map 12.)
Although Hitler had declared that Metz was officially
a fortress, meaning that it would hold out to the last
man, General Balck decided to make no further sacrifices
for the city. He abandoned the second-rate division
fighting in downtown Metz and broke contact, withdrawing
to the east. On 19 November, 90th Division and
5th Division linked up east of Metz, completing the
encirclement of the city. Although some of the forts held
out for two more weeks, the commander of the German
garrison in Metz surrendered on 21 November. Thus, XX
Corps was the first military force to capture Metz by
storm since 451 A.D.
The XX Corps left some elements at Metz to
holdout forts and regrouped the remainder of its
join XII Corps in Third Army's eastward advance.
obstacle confronting Patton's troops was the Westwall,
known to the Allies as the Siegfried Line, that lay just
within Germany proper. The 10th Armored Division had
finally crossed the Moselle on 14 November with orders to
exploit east and north to the Saar River. The American
tanks made some progress to the east against the
determined resistance of the 21st Panzer Division, but the
push to the north came to a halt along an east-west
extension of the Westwall. There would be no clean
breakthrough in XX Corps' sector, just as there had been
none for XII Corps.
Map 13. Third Army Operations, 19 November - 19 December 1944, Lorraine
The German defenders were critical of, but grateful
for, Patton's decision to a broad front of nine
divisons spread out over 60 miles. In particular, they
felt that the Americans made a grave error in not
concentrating their three armored divisions into one corps
for a knockout blow. The 3 panzer divisions in Lorraine
were down to 13, 7, and 4 tanks respectively, a fact that
Patton was well aware of, thanks to Ultra. On paper,
there were 12 German divisions facing Third Army's 9, but
in reality, the defenders possessed just 1 battalion for
each 4 miles of front. Therefore, Patton's decision to
tie his armored divisions to the infantry enabled the
Germans to delay the Third Army with a thin screen and
pull the bulk of their forces back into the Westwall.
Facilitating the German delaying action were the
fortifications of the Maginot Line, numerous streams, and
of course, the weather. Noncombat casualties, most due to
trench foot, roughly equaled combat casualties for the
month of November. Moreover, 95 percent of the trench
foot cases would be out of action, at least until spring.
Part of the blame for the high rate of noncombat
casualties must go to the Quartermaster, European Theater
of Operations, who had refused to order a newly developed
winter uniform for the troops because he believed that the
war would end before cold weather came. Not until January
was there an adequate supply of jackets, raincoats,
overshoes, blankets, and sweaters. As a result, 46,000
troops throughout the European theater were hospitalized,
the equivalent of three infantry divisions.
Weather and enemy action took their greatest toll
among the infantry, which sustained 89 percent of Third
Army's casualties. By the end of November, Patton could
no longer obtain enough infantry fillers to replace the
losses among his rifle units. Manpower planners in the
Pentagon had failed to foresee that the battle along the
German frontier would be a hard-fought affair conducted in
terrible weather and had thus failed to allocate enough
manpower to infantry training. Back in the States, tank
destroyer and antiaircraft battalions were broken up and
sent to infantry training centers. In Lorraine, General
Patton "drafted" 5 percent of army and corps troops for
retraining as infantry, and when bloody fighting along the
Westwall sent infantry losses soaring, he "drafted" an
additional 5 percent.
In early December, Third Army's leading elements had
pushed across the German border at several places along
its front as the Germans withdrew into the Westwall. The
95th Division captured an intact bridge across the Saar
River at Saarlautern in XX Corps' zone and encountered
some of the stiffest resistance yet experienced, as the
German troops fought to defend their own soil. The
Americans discovered that the town of Saarlautern itself
was part of the Westwall. Unlike the Maginot Line or the
Metz fortifications, the Westwall did not consist of
gigantic underground fortresses and heavy artillery
emplacements. Instead, it was a belt of tank obstacles,
barbed wire, pillboxes, and fortified buildings. Although
the Germans considered the Westwall to be antiquated,
shallow, and poorly equipped, it nonetheless constituted a
formidable military obstacle. In Saarlautern the fighting
was literally house-to-house and pillbox-to-pillbox. To
facilitate the slow infantry advance, XX Corps' artillery
fired in direct support of small units. The 8-inch and
240-mm pieces adjusted their fire on individual buildings
on one side of the street, while American infantrymen on
the opposite side of the street prepared to advance. The
90th Division forced a crossing of the Saar at Dillingen
and encountered similar resistance. Casualties mounted as
the Germans brought to bear the heaviest artillery fire
that Third Army had yet experienced. (See Map 13.)
With toeholds established in the Westwall, LTG Patton
initiated planning for a new offensive scheduled to jump
off on 19 December. Veteran units such as the
long-suffering 5th Division were pulled out of the action
for reorganization and training. Patton received another
corps headquarters, III Corps, and some fresh units,
including 87th Division. Third Army's objectives for the
December offensive were the same as they had been in
August--bridgeheads across the Rhine in the vicinity of
Mannheim and Mainz.
Preparations for the attack were well under way when,
on 16 December, Third Army received fragmentary
indications of trouble in First Army's sector to the
north. It rapidly became apparent that a full-scale
German counteroffensive was under way in the Ardennes.
Patton quickly canceled the December offensive and
implemented a contingency plan drawn up some days
previously. The XX Corps abandoned its dearly bought
bridgeheads over the Saar and assumed defensive positions
on the west bank. On 20 December, XII Corps and
III Corps, which had supervised the retraining of infantry
fillers, shuffled divisions and turned north to strike the
flank of the German penetration in the Ardennes. Third
Army eventually assumed control of one other corps
fighting in the Ardennes. The reorientation of a field
army from east to north involved routing 12,000 vehicles
along four roads, establishing a completely new set of
supply points, and restructuring Third Army's entire
signals network to support a new army headquarters in
Luxembourg. Third Army troops entered the Battle of the
Bulge on 22 December, and 4 days later LTC Creighton
Abrams of Arracourt fame led his battalion of the 4th
Armored Division to the relief of Bastogne. (See Map 14.)
The Lorraine campaign, which began in September with
the promise of imminent victory, ended in December with
Third Army rushing north to help avert disaster in the
Ardennes. What conclusions can be drawn from this costly
and frustrating campaign?
Map 14. Third Army Redeployment, 20-26 December 1944
Historians and analysts have often critized yhe
American commanders in the Lorraine campaign. One
shortcoming that they have identified was a tedency
toward overoptimism, criticized an understandable development given the great victories won in July and August and the
information generated by Ultra. The successful conduct of
the operational level of war requires the commander to
look beyond the immediate battlefield and project himself
forward in space and time, but this trait was carried to
excess in Lorraine at the echelons above corps. From
September to December, Eisenhower, Bradley, and Patton had
their sights set firmly beyond the Rhine. Consequently,
they underestimated the obstacles and opposition that
their soldiers would have to overcome along the way.
Thus, a difference in outlook arose between the higher
commanders who drew large arrows on maps and the tactical
units fighting for yards of muddy ground.
General Patton can also be faulted for neglecting to
practice economy of force. We have noted several
instances in which Third Army's forces were spread out on
a broad front in an attempt to be strong everywhere with
the result that they were decisively strong nowhere. In
retrospect, the important battle in September was
XII Corps' fight around Nancy, and in November, the main
effort was XX Corps' assault against Metz. And yet Patton
failed to concentrate Third Army's resources in
reinforcement of the corps engaged in decisive
operations. Furthermore, Patton never made an attempt to
punch through the German defenses with divisions in
column, even though he received approval for such an
operation from his superior, LTG Bradley. One rule of
thumb for mechanized forces that emerged from World War II
was to march dispersed but concentrate to fight. In
Lorraine, Third Army fought dispersed. (See Map 15.)
A similar criticism can be made of Patton's corps
commanders. Walker and Eddy tended repeatedly to disperse
their divisions and assign them missions beyond their
means. We have seen several examples of important
operations undertaken by divisions or parts of divisions
without adequate planning or support, even though other
forces could have been obtained to augment the effort by
practicing economy of force. The corps commanders were
trapped between Patton, who continually urged aggressive
action, and the grim realities of terrain, weather, and a
determined enemy. Perhaps it is not surprising that at
times Walker and Eddy became preoccupied with local
problems and lost sight of the broader issues. As a
result, at the corps level the Lorraine campaign was a
disjointed affair, with little cooperation between corps,
and little continuity from one operation to the next.
However, such operations as the tank battle leading to
Arracourt and the 90th Division crossing of the Moselle at
Koenigsmacker demonstrated that the American corps
commanders were not incapable of applying force in a
flexible and decisive manner.
Map 15. Third Army Operations in Lorraine
The Lorraine campaign taught us some lessons in
combined arms warfare. The tank and the airplane, two
weapons which were commonly believed to have
revolutionized warfare, were an unbeatable combination
during the pursuit, leading up to Lorraine. But when the
enemy dug in and the weather turned bad, infantry,
artillery, and engineers reemerged as the dominant arms.
The critical shortage of infantry fillers demonstrated
that the American high command had failed to anticipate
this development.
This campaign also demonstrated some of the drawbacks
associated with the concept of a relatively light division
reinforced by corps attachments. The triangular division
embodied the characteristics of mobility and maneuver, but
in Lorraine it was repeatedly employed in direct assaults
against an emplaced enemy. The heavy casualties that
occure in such operations were more than the triangular
division could sustain, with the result that the entire
division was often rendered virtually combat ineffective
and had to be withdrawn from the line to rebuild. Perhaps
the division, corps, and army commanders should be faulted
for failing to utilize a greater degree of maneuver for
which the triangular division was much better suited. The
concept of plugging in temporary reinforcements from corps
was seldom practiced as prescribed by doctrine. Instead,
corps tended to assign combat and support elements to the
division on a semipermanent basis, thus making up for some
of the muscle that the triangular division lacked
organically.
The American armored elements were not at their best
in Lorraine either. Much of this can be attributed to the
weather, but some of the blame must be given to the army
commander for binding his armored divisions into
infantry-heavy corps. Patton's reluctance to mass his
armor came as a pleasant surprise to the Germans, who
believed that their panzer divisions were just as useful
in creating breakthroughs as they were in exploiting
them. At a lower level, the combat command concept
provided great tactical flexibility through decentralized
control, but it also tempted Patton's corps commanders to
break up the armored division and parcel it out by combat
commands, a policy that further diluted Third Army's
armored punch. Organizationally, the Armored Division of
1944 proved to be weak in infantry, a shortcoming often
made good by detaching battalions from infantry divisions
and assigning them to armored combat commands.
In addition, American tank crews repeatedly paid a
heavy price for a doctrinal decision made before the war
that declared tanks to be offensive weapons not intended
for defensive combat against other tanks. As a result of
this official policy, the M-4 Sherman tanks in Lorraine
were badly outgunned by German panzers that mounted superb
antitank pieces. The tank-stopping task was officially
assigned to the tank destroyers, which were supposed to be
thinly armored, highly mobile, heavily armed antitank
specialists. Doctrine called for the majority of tank
destroyers to be pooled in special corps and army antitank
reserves, which could rush to the scene of an armored
attack anywhere along the front. But Third Army didn't
need an antitank reserve in Lorraine because German tanks
usually appeared a few at a time. Consequently, the tank
destroyer concept was discarded after the war, when the
U.S. Army decided that the best weapon to stop a tank was
another adequately armed tank.
Finally, the Lorraine campaign demonstrated that
logistics often drive operations, no matter how forceful
and aggressive the commanding general may be. In the
August pursuit that brought Third Army to Lorraine,
General Patton daringly violated tactical principles and
conducted improvised operations with great success. He
discovered, however, that the violation of logistical
principles is an unforgiving and cumulative matter.
Sooner or later, every improvisation and shortcut taken
must be repaid. Third Army's logtstical shortcuts
included burning up gasoline reserves to keep an advance
going and then neglecting ammunition supply to bring up
gasoline. The slowdown that affected all of the Allied
forces in September and October was the inevitable price
to be paid for gambling logistically that the war could be
ended in August. Moreover, in spite of the logistical
mobility afforded by motorization, remember that the
trucks running the Red Ball Express consumed a greater and
greater proportion of their cargoes as the advance
progressed, forcing Third Army to turn to two time-honored
methods of supply--railroad transport and local
requisition.
The lessons of the Lorraine campaign were not all
negative. The American soldier proved himself capable of
carrying the fight to a determined enemy under adverse
conditions, a lesson that would be demonstrated even more
conclusively in the Battle of the Bulge. Armored troops
more than held their own against an enemy possessing
superior equipment. Infantry formations endured trench
foot and debilitating casualty rates. The artillery's
ability to mass its fire at critical points was tactically
decisive time after time. Engineers performed miracles in
their efforts to keep Third Army moving in spite of
demolitions and floods. Support troops overcame
logistical nightmares through ingenuity and sheer hard
work. When the weather permitted, the Army Air Force
blasted out enemy strongpoints in close cooperation with
the ground elements, denied the enemy the use of the roads
in daylight, and forced him to abandon tactics that had
worked against every other opponent.
Was the Lorraine campaign an American victory? From
September through November, Third Army claimed to have
inflicted over 180,000 casualties on the enemy. But to
capture the province of Lorraine, a problem which involved
an advance of only 40 to 60 air miles, Third Army required
over 3 months and suffered 50,000 casualties,
approximately one-third of the total number of casualties
it sustained in the entire European war. (See Map 16.)
Map 16. Third Army Gains, September - December 1944, Lorraine
Ironically, Third Army never used Lorraine a s a
springboard for an advance into Germany after all. Patton
turned most of the sector over to Seventh Army during the
Ardennes crisis, and when the eastward advance resumed
after the Battle of the Bulge, Third Army based its
operations on Luxembourg, not Lorraine. The Lorraine
campaign will always remain a controversial episode in
American military history. SUGGESTED READINGS Bennett, Ralph.
Ultra in the West
. New York: Scribner's, 1980.
Bykofsky, Joseph, and Harold Larson.
The Transportation Corps: Operations Overseas
. U.S. Army World War II. Washington, Of of the Chief of Military History, 1957.
Cole, Hugh M. The Lorraine Campaign
. U.S. Army in World
War II. Army, Washington, DC: Historical Division, U.S 1950.
Greenfield, Kent Roberts, Robert R. Palmer, and
Bell I. Wiley,
The Organization of Ground Combat
Troops
. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington, DC:
Historical Division, U.S. War Department, 1947.
Kemp, Anthony.
The Unknown Battle: Metz, 1944
. New
York: Stein and Day, 1981.
Koch, Oscar W.
G-2: Intelligence for Patton
. Philadelphia: Whitmore, 1971.
MacDonald, Charles B., and Sidney T. Mathews.
Three
Battles: Arnaville, Altuzzo, and Schmidt
. U.S. Army
in World War II. Washington, DC: Office-of the Chief
of Military History, 1952.
Mayo, Lida.
The Ordnance Department: On Beachhead and
Battlefront
. U.S. Army in World War II. Washington,DC:
Office of the Chief of Military History, 1968.
Mellenthin, F. W. von.
Panzer Battles .
Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956.
Ross, William F. The Quartermaster Corps:
the War Against Germany
. U.S. Army in World War II.
Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Military
History, 1965.
U.S. War Department. General Staff.
Small Unit Actions .
American Forces in Action Series. Washington, DC:
Historical Division, War Department, [1946]. See
"Singling (4th Armored Division, 6 December 1944)."
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Dr. Christopher R. Gabel
Dr. Christopher R. Gabel is an associate professor
at the Combat Studies Institute, U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
He received his bachelor's degree at The Pennsylvania
State University and earned M.A. and Ph,D. degrees
in history at The Ohio State University. His graduate
studies focused on the doctrine of the U.S. Army in
the interwar and World War II periods.
COMBAT STUDIES
The Combat Studies Institute was established on 18 June
within the U.S. Army Command and General
following missions:
1. Conduct research on historical topics pertinent to doctrinal
concerns of the Army and publish the results in a variety of formats for
the Active Army and Reserve Components.
2. Prepare and present instruction in military history at USACGSC and assist
other USACGSC departments in integrating military history into their instruction.
3. Serve as the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's executive agent
for the development and coordination of an integrated, progressive program
of military history instruction in the TRADOC service school system.
4. Direct the Combined Arms Center's historical program.
5. Supervise the Fort Leavenworth Museum.
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